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"Are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself

to go to pieces, lest that one be violated?"'
I. INTRODUCTION
The horrific terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 left millions of
people, both in the United States and throughout the world, feeling
vulnerable in a way that we have never felt before. The unprecedented acts
of terror have created public fear that has not previously been present. The
immeasurable damage to the human spirit and our sense of security have
left many individuals searching for reassurance from their governments
that these types of atrocities could never, and would never, transpire again.
Consequently, consistent with what has historically occurred immediately
following most major terrorist events, 2 legislatures around the world
embarked on the task of passing tougher anti-terrorism laws in a frenzy of
activity.3
The governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, under
the premise of national security, responded to the events of September 11,

1. See COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 430 (Roy P. Basker ed., 1953). Abraham
Lincoln was the first president to essentially ignore Congress's power and freely direct the nation
as a "dictator." Faced with the emergency of the Civil War, Lincoln enlarged the Army and Navy
beyond the authorization of Congress and spent money without congressional approval. In addition,
he suspended the writ of habeas corpus which enabled the executive branch to arrest "disloyal"
citizens and anyone who sympathized with the South without a trial. The U.S. Supreme Court
justified President Lincoln's extraordinary conception of executive power based upon the
emergency circumstances. See Melissa K. Mathews, Restoring the Imperial Presidency: An
Examination of PresidentBush's New Emergency Powers, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 455,

465 (2002) (discussing the roles of different presidents in times of war and crisis).
2. For example, several countries ofthe European Union, in addition to the United Kingdom
which is at the focus of this Article, passed anti-terrorism measures in the wake of September 11,
2001. France expanded the powers of police to search private property without a warrant and
Germany engaged in religious profiling of suspected terrorists. See Jeffrey Rosen, Liberty
Wins .. . So Far, Bush Runs Into Checks and Balances in Demanding New Powers, WASH. POST,

Sept. 15, 2002, at B1.
3. See Gregory C. Clark, HistoryRepeating Itself The (D)evolution of Recent British and
American AntiterroristLegislation, 27FORDHAM URB. L.J. 247,247-48 (1999) (comparing the past
efforts of the United States and the United Kingdom to combat terrorism). One of the memorable
phrases that was coined during the troubles in Northern Ireland in the past is the "politics of the last
atrocity." It refers to people taking advantage of the last atrocity to push a political agency or to
score political points. See id Similarly, following the Oklahoma City bombing in the United States
the legislature passed the AEDPA with the goal of making the United States a no-support-forterrorism zone. See id. See also infra note 40 (discussing terrorist events in the United States prior
to September 11, 2001).
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2001 by enacting comprehensive responsive and reactionary legislation.

The measures adopted by the governments of these two nations, while
allaying some of the fears of their citizens and possibly providing them
with a greater sense of security without sacrificing their own liberty, have
in turn sacrificed the liberty of noncitizens. Among other things, this tradeoff has provided the United States and the United Kingdom with the
discretion and the authority to indefinitely detain those noncitizens
certified as terrorists under the new legislation.4
This targeting of noncitizens through the use of anti-terrorism
legislation by the governments of the United States and the United
Kingdom, while not unprecedented or necessarily radical given the
atrocities committed against the citizens of these nations,' does raise

4. "Certified" means that either the Attorney General in the United States or the Secretary
of Labor of the United Kingdom has deemed a particular individual in their respective countries as
a suspected terrorist. What is so striking about both the Patriot Act and the U.K. Anti-Terrorism,
Crime and Security Act is the tremendous power each piece of legislation placed in the discretion
of the government to certify an individual as a terrorist, which leads to automatic preventative
detention. This certification does not require a court order and is permissible upon a reasonable
belief held by the executive that the individual is a terrorist. The certification of suspected terrorists
will be discussed further in Part IV of this Article.
5. Historically, the governments of both the United States and the United Kingdom have
curtailed civil liberties in times of national emergency, finding the state interest in national security
to be paramount to competing interests. During World War I, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
conviction of Eugene Debs for expressing his opposition to the war, refusing to recognize his
violent anti-war advocacy as speech protected by the First Amendment. See Debs v. United States,
249 U.S. 211 (1919); see also Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding conviction
of an individual for distributing anti-war circulars). Likewise, during World War II following the
bombing of Pearl Harbor, the Court upheld an executive order mandating the internment of more
than 100,000 Japanese immigrants based on their ancestry, refusing to recognize their preventive
detention as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1945). During the Cold War, the United States was quick to target anyone suspected of being
associated with the Communist Party. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
Similarly, the United Kingdom has been quick to ignore and suspend civil liberties during
periods of crisis. During World War II, almost 2,000 persons, both citizens and noncitizens alike,
were interned in the United Kingdom without formal charges and without trial. PADDY HILLYARD,
SUSPECT COMMUNITY: PEOPLE'S EXPERIENCE OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACTS INBRITAIN

45(1993). Furthermore, the United Kingdom's ongoing struggle with terrorism in Northern Ireland
has often resulted in the suspension of civil liberties during particularly unstable periods. See
generally id (providing a history of the United Kingdom's response to terrorism in Northern
Ireland and discussing how these responses have resulted in the erosion of civil liberties); DONALD
W. JACKSON, THE UNITED KINGDOM CONFRONTS THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

(1997) (studying the legal conflicts and transitions between the United Kingdom and the European
Court of Human Rights). For example, duringthe infamous "Bloody Sunday," British paratroopers
killed innocent and unarmed protesters in Northern Ireland who were participating in a civil rights
demonstration. See LAURA K. DONAHUE, COUNTER-TERRORIST LAW AND EMERGENCY POWERS IN
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serious concerns regarding exactly how far these nations can proceed in the
name of national security. An in-depth complete analysis and summary of
the extensive anti-terrorism legislation enacted in the United States and the
United Kingdom after September 11, 2001 is well beyond the scope of this
Article and has been extensively discussed elsewhere.' These legislative

acts, while undoubtedly sudden responses of both governments to the
terrorist attacks, served as catchalls for many initiatives, a majority of
which are noncontroversial.
This Article will examine a select few of those sections of the U.S.
United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools

THE UNITED KINGDOM 1922-2000, 121(2000); Clark, supra note 3, at 253. After this horrific event,

Ireland erupted in violence and chaos. In response, the United Kingdom suspended the Parliament
of Northern Ireland and resorted to direct control of the province. See id. at 253-54. In addition, the
United Kingdom passed two important pieces of legislation, the Emergency Powers Act and the
Prevention of Terrorism Act. These Acts and their effect on civil liberties will be discussed in more
detail in Part III of this Article.
An in-depth examination of the curtailment of civil liberties of both the United States and the
United Kingdom during times of crisis is well beyond the scope of this Article. This issue has,
however, been addressed by numerous other scholars. See generally Mathews, supra note 1
(comparing the recent curtailment of civil liberties by President Bush with the past policies of
notable U.S. Presidents); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002) (addressing the
U.S. treatment of noncitizens during times of crisis, both past and present); JACKSON, supra
(studying violations by the United Kingdom ofthe ECHR); HILLYARD, supra (exploring the powers
of the United Kingdom during times of crisis and describing how the entire Northern Ireland
community has been targeted and criminalized by these powers).
6. See generallyJennifer C. Evans, HijackingCivil Liberties: The USA PatriotAct of2001,
33 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 933 (2002) (discussing the various provisions of the Patriot Act and their
potential consequences for civil liberties); Amnesty International, United States of America,
Amnesty International'sConcerns RegardingPost September 11 Detentions in the USA, Mar. 2002

(outlining various provisions of the Patriot Act and discussing their implications for civil liberties),
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/usa/document.do?id=E7EA69A
4BB5FA3B980256B7B006439B7 (last visited Jan. 3, 2004); Michael T. McCarthy, USA Patriot
Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 435 (2002) (examining the Patriot Act's expansion of government
authority and its impact on civil liberties); see generally Virginia Helen Henning, Anti-Terrorism,
Crime and Security Act 2001: Has the United Kingdom Made a Valid Derogationfrom the

European Convention on Human Rights?, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1263 (2002) (discussing
whether the broad powers authorized to the United Kingdom under the ATCSA are consistent with
their obligations under the ECHR); Amnesty International, UnitedKingdom, Basic Rights Denied
After 11 September, Sept. 5, 2002 (expressing deep concern about serious human rights violations
that have taken place as a consequence of the U.K. response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks in the United States), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2002/uk09052002_2.
html (last visited Jan. 3, 2004); Adam Tomkins, Legislatingagainst Terror: The Anti-Terrorism,
Crime and Security Act 2001, PuB. L., 2002, at 205 (discussing the various measures of the
ATCSA); Sadiq Khan, Anti-Terrorism Crime andSecurity Act 2001, SOLICrrORS J., Jan. 11, 2002,
at 10; Michael Zander, The Anti-Terrorism Bill - What Happened?, NEW L.J., Dec. 21, 2001, at
1880.
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Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (PATRIOT
Act)' and the U.K. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
(ATCSA)$ which have proven extremely controversial. These provisions
stand out as radical in the degree in which they sacrifice freedom in the
name of national security. More specifically, the focus will be limited to
sections 411 and 412 of the Patriot Act and part 4 of the ATCSA, which
provide the governments of the United States and United Kingdom with
extensive powers to take into custody and detain noncitizens suspected of
terrorism.9 Each piece of legislation respectively enables the Attorney
General of the United States and the Secretary of State of the United
Kingdom to certify any noncitizen whom he suspects to be a terrorist. 0
Upon certification, the provisions which will be examined require the
mandatory detention of these individuals until the noncitizen is either
ordered removed from the country or found not to be removable, and
authorize the potential indefinite detention of these noncitizens who have
been certified as terrorists."

Part II of this Article will introduce the advantages and disadvantages
that accompany the various theories of mandatory detention. Keeping these
theories in mind, Part III will begin by examining the major points of
difference between the governments of the United States and the United
Kingdom. An understanding of the structural differences between the two
governments is essential before embarking on a comparison of their antiterrorist legislation, both past and present. This part will then lay the
statutory framework for the Patriot Act and the ATCSA by providing a
brief history of the indefinite detention of noncitizen suspected terrorists
in the United States and the United Kingdom prior to September 11, 2001.
In examining the past efforts of these countries to combat terrorism prior
to September 11, 2001 and by establishing exactly what the law was prior
to the enactment of the Patriot Act and the ATCSA, we can better
understand the changes these pieces of legislation authorized.
Part IV will then outline and compare specific detention provisions of
the Patriot Act and the ATCSA which are at the crux of this Article. The

7. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
8. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, ch. 24 (Eng.).
9. See USA PATRIOT Act §§ 411, 412 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.); Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act §§ 21-30.
10. See USA PATRIOT Act (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); AntiTerrorism, Crime and Security Act § 21.
11. See USA PATRIOT Act § 412 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.);
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act §§ 21-29.
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comparison will first examine the definition of a terrorist and exactly what
qualifies as a terrorist activity under each of the respective acts in an effort
to explain precisely how a decision is made to certify a noncitizen as a
terrorist. This Part will then look at the implications of being certified a
terrorist as it pertains to custody, release, and commencement of
proceedings and analyze the detention provisions and the potential
concerns that each piece of legislation raises. In addition, this Part will also
demonstrate how each act purports to place a limitation on detention by
examining the ability of certified terrorists under each piece of legislation
to obtain judicial review of their certification. Finally, this Part will
examine and analyze the various arguments which have been made against
each piece of legislation. As this Part will establish, while each act
presumably limits the amount of time a certified noncitizen terrorist can be
detained, a close reading reveals that indefinite detention is a possibility.
Nevertheless, despite the prospect of indefinite detention, this analysis and
comparison of each piece of legislation will also illustrate just how
reasoned a response the Patriot Act is to protect the United States from the
threats ofterrorists and terrorism. On the contrary, as will be explained, the
ATCSA cannot be similarly justified.
Part V will first posit how the U.S. Supreme Court would rule on the
constitutionality ofthe detention provisions ofthe Patriot Act and similarly
whether the European Court of Human Rights would find that the United
Kingdom," in enacting the detention provisions of the ATCSA, has
violated its obligation to protect human rights and democratic principles
under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)."3 While each
court has yet to rule on such issues, their previous decisions with regards
to the detention provisions enacted in past legislation and their decisions
during times of national crisis can guide us in making such an inquiry.
Ultimately, the question for both the U.S. Supreme Court and the European
Court of Human Rights is whether these governments can sacrifice the
liberties of others for the purported security of their citizens. It is probable
that the controversial provisions of the Patriot Act will be upheld by the
Supreme Court; however, it is questionable as to whether the European
Court would similarly uphold the detention provisions of the ATCSA.
Irrespective of how each court would rule, this Article will conclude that

the detention strategy is inherently flawed and is unlikely, at least in the
long-term, to achieve the goals of preventing other terrorist attacks.

12. The European Court of Human Rights was established under article 19 ofthe ECHR. The
European Court will be discussed in more detail in Parts IV and V of this Article.
13. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR].
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Finally, this Article will argue that despite the indisputable curtailment

of the civil liberties ofnoncitizens under both acts, the detention provisions
embodied in the Patriot Act represent a reasoned and proportionate
response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, while those under the
ATCSA cannot be similarly justified. Even though the Patriot Act has
come under heavy fire in both the United States and throughout the world,
in researching the state of liberty and security after September 11, it is
astounding to observe how restrained the legal response of the United
States appears when contrasted with that of the United Kingdom. Although
the United Kingdom was not directly attacked, the detention provisions of
the ATCSA are far more sweeping than those authorized under the Patriot
Act. In comparing the legislative responses of both the United States and
the United Kingdom to the terroristattacks, it becomes apparent that while
the Patriot Act is a rational legislative response which includes sufficient
protections to defend those subject to the Patriot Act's detention
provisions, the unrestrained powers of the British government under the
ATCSA are neither strictly necessary, nor balanced, nor accompanied by
adequate procedural safeguards to protect the rights of those detained

under the ATCSA.
II. THEORIES OF MANDATORY DETENTION
An appropriate starting point in the comparison of the detention
provisions of the Patriot Act and the ATCSA is a brief analysis of the basic
theories which underlie the mandatory detention of noncitizens. In this
analysis, it is essential to compare the benefits of categorical, mandatory
detention with the benefits of case-by-case determinations which take into
consideration the particular individual's potential threat to public safety
and the person's likelihood of disappearing altogether. Simply put, do the
benefits of mandatory detention outweigh the costs?
First, mandatory detention saves money because it avoids the expense
of individualized hearings. 4 The government has limited resources and
cannot afford to do a case-by-case adjudication of each noncitizen who is
suspected of being a terrorist.15 Second, mandatory detention diminishes
the possibility of errors that arise when a detention determination is done
on a case-by-case basis." Predictions about the threat of a person to the

14. Stephen H. Legomsky, The Detention ofAliens: Theories, Rules and Discretion, 30 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 531, 544 (1999).
15. Id. at 545-46.
16. Id.
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public's safety or the individual's likeliness to disappear are inherently
risky." Often in the course of an individualized hearing, not all the
evidence will be discovered or presented and the findings of fact may not
be accurate.'8 In essence, mandatory detention, by eliminating the risk of
prosecutorial error, protects the public more thoroughly. Finally,

mandatory detention deters further immigration violations.' 9 It both

advances the government's interest in ensuring the removal of aliens who
are ordered deported and sends a message to those noncitizens
contemplating criminal or terrorist acts in the United States. 2o Arguably, if
suspected terrorists are aware that they could be detained indefinitely, they
may be discouraged from attempting to enter the United States illegally or
from filing frivolous asylum claims.2 1
Nevertheless, there are shortcomings to the above mentioned theories.
Inevitably, mandatory detention will lead to a number of false positives,
i.e., some of the people detained may or may not be suspected terrorists."
Furthermore, these individuals may not pose any threat to the public's
safety and may not abscond upon release. Some disadvantages include the
deprivation of individual liberty; the inability to work and socialize; and
isolation from friends, family, and the community. In addition, the
individual suffers an economic loss by being unable to work, which in turn
results in the loss of income tax revenue that the detained person's
employment would have generated, as well as the increased public costs
of providing detention and possibly supporting the detainee's dependents
through public assistance programs.23 These losses combined constitute a
great waste of both human and financial resources."
On the other hand, and even more significantly, many individuals who
do not fall squarely within any of the categories of persons who are
automatically subject to mandatory detention may in fact still present a real
danger of absconding or pose a real threat to public safety.2 5 Every time the
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) is required to
detain a person who in fact poses no threat or danger at all, it has one fewer

17. Id.
18. Id. at 546.
19. Legomsky, supranote 14, at 546.
20. Id.; see also Daniel R. Dinger, When We Cannot Deport, Is It Fair to Detain? An
Analysis ofthe Rights ofDeportableAliens Under8 U.S.C. § 1231(A)(6) and the 1999 INS Interim
ProceduresGoverning Detentions, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1, 6.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Legomsky, supra note 14, at 546.
Id. at 545-46.
Id. at 546-47.
Id.
Id. at 547.
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detention spot available for a person who poses a threat and whom the
BCIS would have had the discretion to detain. 26 This factor is of great
consequence. At any one time, there are approximately 125,000 persons in
removal proceedings, but the BCIS has only 14,000 detention beds." To
the extent that mandatory detention is intended to minimize false
negatives, therefore, the strategy might even be counterproductive. 28
Nevertheless, it appears that at least in certain cases, mandatory
detention serves a useful enforcement function. There are, however, great
drawbacks that accompany mandatory detention. With the advantages and
disadvantages of mandatory detention in mind, we now turn to the
statutory framework that existed in regards to the mandatory detention of
noncitizens suspected of terrorism in the United States and the United
Kingdom prior to the tragic events of September 11, 2001.

III. MANDATORY DETENTION OF NONCITIZENS SUSPECTED OF
TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM BEFORE

SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

A comparison of any type of legislation enacted by two independent
governments must begin with a basic understanding of how each
government works and an explanation of the fundamental differences
between the two systems. Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom
does not have a supreme written constitution and an established bill of
rights.2 9 The United Kingdom is a unitary state with a parliament whose
legislative power is, legally speaking, unfettered, since there is no
overriding written constitution limiting its powers, and no power in the
courts to invalidate an Act of Parliament. 30 In addition, the principle of

26. Legomsky, supra note 14, at 547.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Jacqueline Ann Carberry, Terrorism:A Global Phenomenon Mandating a Unified

InternationalResponse, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 685, 695 (1999); Roberta Smith, America
Tries to Come to Terms with Terrorism: The United States Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
PenaltyAct of1996 v. BritishAnti-TerrorismLaw andInternationalResponse, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L

& COMIP. L. 249,283 (1997); D.G.T. Williams, Aspects ofEqualProtectionin the UnitedKingdom,
59 TuL. L. REV. 959,960 (1985); see also Douglas W. Vick, The Human RightsAct andthe British
Constitution,37TEx. INT'L L.J. 329 (2002) (examining in-depth the nature and source ofthe unique
constitution of the United Kingdom).
30. See David Bonner, United Kingdom: The United Kingdom Response to Terrorism, in

WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 171-72 (Alex P. Schmid & Ronald D. Crelinsten eds., 1993);
see generally A.W. BRADLEY & K.D. EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1997)
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separation of powers, while underlying the structure of the U.S.
government, is unheard of within the British system. 3' In the absence of a
federal system of government, the United Kingdom merges the functions
of the executive and the legislature and does not provide the power of
judicial review of primary legislation.32
These differing frameworks, and more specifically the absence of a
power of judicial review of primary legislation, significantly affect the
breadth of legislation and the powers afforded to government officials."
This is clearly apparent and important when examining the anti-terrorism
legislation enacted by the two governments over the years. Due to the
absence of a formalized written constitution or a formal bill of rights,
British law has consistently granted more power to its government to
control terrorism. 34 This is because in the United Kingdom there is
essentially a single principle, that of the sovereignty of Parliament, which
allows the Parliament - technically the monarch, the House of Lords and
the House of Commons - unlimited power to alter both the substance and
procedure of government.3 5 This has resulted in the enactment of numerous
specific anti-terrorism measures in response to the ongoing conflict
between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. 36 Nevertheless, this
power is not unchecked. The European Court of Human Rights monitors
the British anti-terrorism provisions and places pressure on the government
to respect basic human rights and liberties.37

&

(analyzing in-depth British law, the practice of the constitution, and the overall structure of the U.K.
government).
31. See Carberry,supra note 29, at 695.
32. Id
33. Id Even in the absence ofjudicial review, however, British judges are familiar with the
exercise of that leading constitutional rule: the early strands of authority for modem concepts of
judicial review date back from seventeenth-century England. See Williams, supranote 29, at 964
(discussing further the concept of judicial review in the United Kingdom); see also BRADLEY
EWING, supra note 30, at 803-29.
34. See Carberry,supra note 29, at 695. Examples of this type power granted to the British
government to combat terrorism will be discussed in more detail in Part III.B of this Article.
35. See Barry Jones & Michael Keating, Nations, Regions, andEurope: The UK Experience,
in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND REGIONS 89 (Barry Jones & Michael Keating eds., 1995).
36. See id.; see generally DONAHUE, supra note 5 (discussing the exercise of extraordinary
state power by the United Kingdom in Ireland and the repeated codification of emergency powers
as a means to retain control over Ireland). In addition, Part III.B of this Article will provide a
summary of the U.K. anti-terrorism legislation prior to September 11, 2001.
37. See Carberry, supra note 29, at 695; Smith, supra note 29, at 283. The rulings of the
European Court of Human Rights are binding on the United Kingdom since it has ratified the
ECHR and fully accepted its control mechanism. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom, although
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Conversely, the United States has historically addressed terrorism on
a less formalized basis than the United Kingdom.38 Instead of creating
specific anti-terrorism legislation, the United States has generally
incorporated anti-terrorism measures into pre-existing laws. 39 While the
lack of explicit anti-terrorism legislation can partially be attributed to the
nation's unique governmental structure, it is primarily the consequence of
the limited exposure of the United States to domestic terrorism. Unlike the
British, it was not until the 1990s that Americans were attacked at home
and realized that they were no longer insulated from terrorism within their
borders. Prior to this time, the government could not justify, nor did it need
to enact, anti-terrorist legislation at the expense of civil liberties and rights.
Beginning with the bombing on the World Trade Center in 1993 and
culminating with the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995, however, the
government enacted comprehensive legislation which would address
terrorism both domestically and internationally.4 0 These tragedies
committed on U.S. soil brought the vulnerabilities to the forefront and
brought home to Americans the reality that they too are susceptible to acts
of terrorism. While it would be another six years until the devastating
September 11, 2001 attacks, these events resulted in a dramatic shift in the
attitudes of both the American people and Congress towards terrorism.
Irrespective of the structural differences of the governments of the
United States and the United Kingdom, and regardless of the anti-terrorism
legislation enacted by each of these governments in the past, it is probable
that nothing could have prepared either nation for the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Before focusing on the legislative reactions to
September 11, 2001, however, it is necessary to explain how the newly
granted detention powers authorized by the Patriot Act and the ATCSA
have altered the landscape of noncitizen detention law in the United States
and the United Kingdom. Thus, it is useful to first survey the rules
governing detention as they existed prior to September 11, 2001 as well as
to examine the key judicial decisions interpreting and applying them. Only
then can we contemplate whether these governments have proceeded too

obligated under the ECHR, has consistently violated the treaty. See generally JACKSON, supra note
5 (examining closely select violations of the ECHR by the United Kingdom).
38. See Smith, supra note 29, at 283-84.
39. Id.
40. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW ANDPOLICY 843 (3d ed. 2002).
Although a U.S. citizen perpetrated the attack on the Murrah Federal Office Building in Oklahoma
City, Congress seized the opportunity to enact broad terrorism legislation to quell the public's fear
of both citizen and noncitizen terrorists alike. See id.
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far in sacrificing the freedoms of noncitizens in the name of national
security.
A. The Mandatory Detention of Noncitizen Terrorists in the United
States Prior to September 11, 2001
Beginning in the 1950s and lasting through the 1980s, the legal
structure governing the detention of noncitizens was relatively clear and
understood. First, a critical distinction was made between resident
noncitizens who had obtained entry into the United States, but who had yet
to qualify for naturalization (including both legal and illegal resident
noncitizens), and excludable noncitizens who had been detained at the
border (including noncitizens who had been paroled into the United
States). 4' If a noncitizen was deemed excludable, and thus was stopped at
the port of entry, the individual could be detained indefinitely.4 2
Conversely, if the noncitizen was found deportable, meaning that the
noncitizen had already procured entry into the United States, he could only
be held for six months. 43 This distinction was extremely important because
at that time it was widely held that the U.S. Constitution afforded greater
rights to noncitizens already in the United States than to those who had
only just arrived at the border." After the expiration of this six-month

41. See M. Gavan Montague, Should Aliens Be Indefinitely Detained Under 8 U.S. C. § 1231?
Suspect Doctrines and Legal Fictions Come Under Renewed Scrutiny, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1439,
1441-42 (2001). Under INA section 212(d)(5), the Attorney General has the discretion to "parole"
a noncitizen into the United States temporarily. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d)(5)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(d)(5) (2000)). Until 1980 the parole provision was often used to allow
groups of refugees into the United States for indefinite periods. Today the provision is typically
used to either enable noncitizens to come to the United States temporarily for urgent personal
reasons or to allow applicants for admission to avoid detention pending determinations of
admissibility. A grant of parole, however, is not considered an admission. See LEGOMSKY, supra
note 40, at 137.
42. See Harvard Law Review Association, Plight of the Tempest-Tost: Indefinite Detention
of Deportable Aliens, 155 HARV. L. REV. 1915, 1919 (2002); David A. Martin, Graduated
Application ofConstitutional ProtectionsforAliens: The Real Meaning ofZadvydas v. Davis, 2001
SUP. CT. REv. 47, 52 (2001); see also United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537,
544 (1950) (ruling that excludable noncitizens had no right ofajudicial audit, applying independent
constitutional standards, ofthe procedures used in exclusion proceedings: "Whatever the procedure
authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.");
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (authorizing the indefinite
detention of a noncitizen on Ellis Island).
43. See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 42, at 1919; Martin, supra note 42,
at 52.
44. See Martin, supra note 42, at 52.
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period, the deportable noncitizen could be released. 45 The release of the
noncitizen, however, was often conditioned on certain supervision and
reporting requirements. 46
In 1988, however, the statutory picture became considerably more
complicated when Congress began to mandate the detention of particular
undesirable noncitizens. For example, in response to public outrage over
high crime rates and increased drug consumption, Congress enacted the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (ADAA), 47 which amended the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) 48 to mandate detention of any alien convicted
of an "aggravated felony." 49
1. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
ADAA required the Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) to hold
noncitizens in detention throughout the deportation hearings and until

45. See id. Several cases found an equitable exception suspending the running of the sixmonth period ifthe noncitizen in any way delayed the process of securing traveling documents. See,
e.g., Dor v. Dist. Dir. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002-03 (2d Cir. 1989); Balogun v. INS, 9 F.3d 347, 351
(5th Cir. 1993).
46. An example of immigration parole can be best understood through the example of the
Marielitos. In 1980, the Cuban government opened up the port of Mariel for American citizens or
residents to come and retrieve their family members. In addition, the Cuban government emptied
their prisons and placed many ex-prisoners on boats to the United States. The ensuing boatlift
brought over 120,000 Cubans to the United States. Upon arrival, these noncitizens were excludable,
but the political situation did not enable the United States to return them to Cuba. As the sheer
number of people made it impossible for the INS to process each noncitizen, virtually all of the
Marielitos were released, but on immigration parole. Problems with the indefinite detention ofthese
individuals arose, however, when these Marielitos violated the conditions of their parole and began
committing crimes after their release. While the U.S. Supreme Court never ruled on the detention
of these individuals, numerous district courts upheld the indefinite detention of the Marielitos. See
generally Guzman v. Tippy, 130 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 1997); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th
Cir. 1986); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 1984); MARIOA. RIVERA, DECISION
AND STRUCTURE: U.S. REFUGEE POLICY IN THE MARIEL CRISIS (1991)(examining the Cuban boatlift

and its catastrophic consequences for the United States); see also LEGOMSKY, supra note 40, at 6165.
47. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
48. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2002).
49. Id. § 7343(a)(4)(amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)). The ADAA defined aggravated felonies
as crimes involving murder, drug trafficking, illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices,
and attempts or conspiracies to commit such crimes in the United States. Id. § 7342 (amending 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)); see also Dawn Marie Johnson, The AEDPA and the IIRIRA: Treating
Misdemeanorsas Feloniesfor ImmigrationPurposes, 27 J. LEGIs. 477,480-81 (2001) (discussing

the effects of the ADAA on immigration law and deportation proceedings).
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actual removal.5 0 As one could expect, this legislation was controversial
and was consequently challenged by noncitizens who were lawfully
admitted prior to the enactment of ADAA and who had finished serving
their criminal sentences.5 ' These individuals were now not only subject to
deportation, but also faced the possibility of potential indefinite detention
as a result of their previous criminal convictions. Many courts struggled
with ADAA and split on the validity of the legislation, with only a few
upholding the legislation and many more holding that the noncitizens were
entitled to an individualized consideration of release.52 Shortly thereafter,
Congress bowed to pressure and liberalized the policy slightly by allowing
the release of noncitizens who had been legally admitted into the United
States and who could demonstrate that they did not pose a flight risk or
danger to the community. 53 Even with the amendments, however, the
statute still permitted, and in some cases required, post-order detention of
noncitizens beyond the six-month period for those aggravated felons who

50. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, § 7343(a)(4) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)).
51. See Martin, supra note 42, at 61.
52. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (holding that the statute violated both
substantive and procedural due process by denying the noncitizen any opportunity to prove that he
was neither likely to abscond or a danger to the community); Va Peng Joe v. Thornburgh, 1990 WL
167457 (D. Mass. 1990) (striking down the statute on both substantive and procedural due process
grounds); Kellman v. Dist. Dir. INS, 750 F. Supp 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (invalidating the statute);
but see Morrobel v. Thornburgh, 744 F. Supp. 725 (E.D. Va. 1990) (finding that the statute did not
violate substantive due process because the plenary power doctrine of Congress over immigration
law confined the Court to searching for a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for the restriction
and that given the urgency of the war on drugs, this reason was easy to find). To understand why
the Morrobeldecision was decided in this way, it is important to note that the Court in this case
characterized the plaintiff's constitutional argument as substantive, and not procedural. The
individual had a bail hearing and he had requested relief which had been denied by the immigration
judge. Therefore, the Court concluded, what the plaintiff was really challenging was the substantive
validity of the aggravated felony preclusion and that there was no procedural due process issue and
thus no need to determine whether individualized hearings were constitutionally required. The
Court, only having to address the plaintiff's substantive arguments, was confined to the plenary
power doctrine and only needed to find a facially and bona fide reason for the restriction. Again,
given the urgency of the war on drugs, the Court held that this was not difficult to find. See
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (setting forth the "facially legitimate and bona fide
reason" standard utilized by the Court in Morrobel); see also LEGOMSKY, supra note 40, at 93-94.
53. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 504(a), 104 Stat.
5049 (former 8 U.S.C. § 1252); see also LEGOMSKY, supra note 40, at 94; THOMAS ALEXANDER
ALEINKOFF ETAL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 898 (1998); Harvard Law
Review Association, supra note 42, at 1920; Stacy J. Borisov, Give Me Liberty or Give Me
Deportation:The Indefinite Detentionof Non-Removable, CriminalA liens, 13 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 183, 191 (2001).
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could not be removed. 4 Furthermore, those noncitizens who were not
lawfully admitted, or who were excludable, had no right to attempt to
demonstrate qualification for release." Nevertheless, the decisions
considering whether these detentions were lawful were often upheld based
on the fact that individualized consideration had been given to the
noncitizen's release. 6
As a result of the amendments to ADAA, the rules mandating the
detention of noncitizens appeared to be somewhat unclear. No longer was
there any bright-line rule requiring the release of a detained noncitizen
after six months. The new rules governing the detention of both deportable
noncitizens and excludable noncitizens purported to authorize indefinite
detention provided that there was an opportunity for regular review of the
detention decision. Even this rule, however, was not entirely clear. It was
not until 1996, with the passing of both the Anti-terrorism and the
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)" and the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)58 that Congress
abruptly changed its direction and began to clarify the rules governing the
mandatory detention of noncitizens.

2. The AEDPA
Following the Oklahoma City Bombing, an unrelenting and fiercely
resolved Congress capitalized on the public's concern with terrorism in
passing the AEDPA in April 1996.59 Congress seized this opportunity to
come down hard on criminal noncitizens, especially those who were
suspected terrorists. 6 This legislation, along with the IIRIRA which was
enacted later in the same year, radically altered the statutory framework
that governed the detention ofnoncitizens. Combined, the AEDPA and the
IIRIRA extended mandatory detention to several other major categories:
(1) almost anyone who was inadmissible or deportable on crime-related

54. See ALEINKOFF ET AL., supra note 53, at 898.

55. Id.
56. Id.; see also Hernandez-Ebank v. Caplinger, 951 F. Supp. 99 (E.D. La. 1996) (finding
no constitutional violation in holding a noncitizen indefinitely because the noncitizen had entered
lawfully and had received a bond hearing).
57. Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
58. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
59. See Clark, supra note 3, at 248.
60. While those responsible for the Oklahoma City Bombing were American citizens,
Congress still used this opportunity to come down hard on all terrorists, and noncitizen terrorists
in particular.
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grounds (not just aggravated felons); (2) those who were inadmissible or
deportable on terrorism grounds; (3) most arriving passengers (i.e., those
noncitizens who had yet to be admitted into the United States); and (4)
individuals who were awaiting the execution of final removal orders. 6' In
addition, under both the AEDPA and the IIRIRA, judicial review of
immigration decisions was severely restricted. 62
The AEDPA significantly impacted the rules governing the detention
of noncitizens in three important ways. First, it eliminated the exception
provided under the previous law for the release of those aliens previously
admitted lawfully who were determined by the INS to pose no threat to the
community. 3 In other words, lawfully admitted convicted, aggravated
felons were no longer entitled to an individualized consideration of release
and could potentially be detained indefinitely. Essentially, this marked a
return to the unrelenting detention mandate which was enacted by ADAA
in 1988. Second, the AEDPA vastly expanded the definition of an
aggravated felon, and thus, subjected a broader category of noncitizens to
mandatory detention during removal proceedings and thereafter until
repatriation. 64 Consequently, more aliens were subject to deportation based
upon their classification as an aggravated felon.65 Finally, in addition to
expanding the definition of aggravated felony, the AEDPA made nearly all
deportable aliens with a criminal record ineligible for a relief provision that
had previously allowed seven-year lawfully permitted residents who
committed crimes to seek discretionary relief from deportation from an
immigration judge by showing rehabilitation, family or community ties,

61. See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, §§ 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 255
(b)(2)(A), 236(c)(1)(A-D), 241(a)(1-3), 66 Stat. 163, 177 (1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. §§
1101-1557 (2000)).
62. See id.; see David Cole, No Clear Statement: An Argument for PreservingJudicial

Review of Removal Decisions, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 427 (1998) (examining fully how the AEDPA
and the IIRIRA limited judicial review of immigration actions).
63. See Borisov, supra note 53, at 191-92.
64. See id. at 191; see also Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(43) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000)) (outlining those crimes which are deemed to be aggravated felonies).
While the list of aggravated felonies is long, some examples include murder, rape, sexual abuse of
a minor, illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, and illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive
devices or in explosive materials. See id
65. Since the introduction of the concept of an "aggravated felony" in 1988 with the passing
of ADAA, the definition has been vastly expanded. See Martin, supranote 42, at 63. The IIRIRA,
passed shortly after the AEDPA, expanded the concept of aggravated felony to an even wider range
of offenses, by lowering certain thresholds that had to be exceeded before several of the most
widely applicable parts of the definition would apply. See LEGOMsKY, supra note 40, at 540-556
(discussing in-depth the changes the AEDPA and the IIRIRA made to the definition of an
aggravated felony).
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and other favorable factors. 66 In sum, because the AEDPA eliminated the
exception under previous law which allowed the INS to release those
noncitizens previously lawfully admitted if they were deemed to pose no
danger to the community or risk of flight, the INS lost its discretion to
release most criminal noncitizens, irrespective oftheir removal prospects. 67
Many of the changes under the AEDPA did not remain in effect for
long. The IIRIRA, passed only a few months after the AEDPA, was
responsible for amending the INA and subjecting a broader category of
noncitizens to mandatory detention during removal proceedings and
thereafter until repatriation.6 8 Essentially, under the IRIRA, if a noncitizen
had been convicted of an aggravated felony, upon completion of his prison
sentence, he could then be placed into the custody of the INS through an
order of the Attorney General.6 9 The Attorney General then had the
authority to determine whether the noncitizen should be released into the
United States or removed.7 0

3. The IIRIRA
The IIRIRA made three significant changes to the prior sections of the
INA that pertained to the indefinite detention of noncitizens. First, the
IIRIRA redefined the long-standing distinctions between excludable and
deportable noncitizens.' As discussed above, prior to the passing of the
IIRIRA, noncitizens who were stopped at the port of entry and detained at
that point were deemed excludable, even if they were eventually granted
conditional parole into the United States.7 2 Alternatively, noncitizens who
had gained entry into the United States, either legally or illegally, were
considered deportable.7 3 This distinction was extremely important because
traditionally courts had ruled that the U.S. Constitution afforded greater
rights to noncitizens already in the United States than to those who had

66. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (2000)); see
also Martin, supranote 42, at 63.
67. See Borisov, supranote 53, at 192.
68. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(2) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)
(2000)) ("During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien."); see also
Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 42, at 1921.
69. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(2) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(2) (2000))
(an alien who "is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable").
70. See id § 241 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2000)).
71. See Montague, supra note 41, at 1443.
72. See id.; see also Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, n.4 (3d Cir. 1999).
73. See id.
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only just arrived at the border. 74 The IIRIRA, however, abolished the
significant legal distinction between excludable and deportable noncitizens
by labeling both excludable noncitizens and noncitizens who had illegally
entered the country inadmissible." These noncitizens, along with
noncitizens who had legally entered the United States, were now subject
to uniform removal proceedings.7 6 Hence, the bright-line which once
existed between those stopped at the border and those apprehended within
the United States became blurred. Second, the IIRIRA expanded the

offenses for which noncitizens could be removed." Any crime that carried
more than a one-year prison sentence, irrespective of how much time was
served, or any crime that involved drugs or a firearm, now resulted in
removal.7 8
Finally, and most significantly for the plight of noncitizens detained on
grounds of suspected terrorism, the IIRIRA eased the detention mandate
under the AEDPA and restored some release discretion to the INS. 9 The
IIRIRA enacted a new section of the INA, § 241(a), that comprehensively
governed post-order detention, irrespective of the ground of deportability
or excludability and regardless of the noncitizen's criminal record.8 0 It
mandated the detention of all removable aliens for a ninety-day "removal

period" that started when the order became final, and it directed the INS to
ensure the aliens' departure within that time." It then provided for

74. See Martin, supra note 42, at 52 (discussing the exclusion-deportation line and its impact
on noncitizens); see also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (holding that the
power to exclude foreigners is an incident of sovereignty in turning away a Chinese immigrant at
the border who had previously lived in the United States); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651
(1892) (excluding a Japanese immigrant whose husband already lived in the United States at the
point of entry); United States ex. rel Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (preventing the
wife of a U.S. citizen from entering the country without the opportunity for a hearing and holding
"whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry
is concerned."); Shaughnessy v. United States ex. rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (refusing to allow
back into the United States an individual who had previously lived in the United States for many
years without incident).
75. See Montague, supra note 41, at 1443.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 1444.
78. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 237 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(2) (2000)).
79. See id. § 241 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2000)); see also Montague, supra
note 41, at 1444.
80. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2000));
see also Martin, supra note 42, at 66.
81. See Martin, supra note 42, at 66.
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supervised release if removal had not been achieved during that period. 2
The law not only required the mandatory detention of deportable
noncitizens for a period of ninety days while the INS made travel
arrangements for their return, but also provided that criminal noncitizens
could be detained beyond the removal period.83 The federal government
allowed exceptions in limited circumstances, permitting the release of
aliens who were enrolled in witness protection programs and who did not
pose flight or security risks.84
Therefore, while detention after the ninety-day removal period was not
mandated for anyone, it was now explicitly permissible for specified
categories of noncitizens. Furthermore, now a single unified post-removal
order detention regime covered both those noncitizens stopped at the
border as well as resident noncitizens who may have lived their entire lives
in the United States. These changes, coupled with the increasingly broad
range of crimes for which noncitizens could now be deported, significantly
expanded the number of noncitizens subject to indefinite detention.8 5

82. See id.; see also Immigration and Nationality Act § 236 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
(2000)).
83. See Immigration and nationality Act § 241 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2000))(Criminal
noncitizens included those removable on terrorist grounds, as well as those convicted of crimes of
moral turpitude, aggravated felonies, drug-related offenses, firearms offenses, and a catchall
category of "miscellaneous crimes," or those noncitizens who were determined by the Attorney
General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal.). Recent
court decisions have invalidated the no-bail provision of the INA as it applies to lawful permanent
residents. See Pu Chan Hoang v. Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247, 1260 (10th Cir. 2002) (concluding that
"the government has failed to show special justifications for the mandatory detention provision
contained in INA §236(c) which are sufficient to outweigh a lawful permanent resident alien's
constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint without an individualized
determination of flight risk or danger to the public"); Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523, 535 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that "the government has not provided a 'special justification' for no-bail civil
detention sufficient to overcome a lawful permanent resident alien's liberty interest in an

individualized determination of flight risk and dangerousness").
84. ALEINKOFF ET AL., supra note 53, at 883.
85. See Martin, supra note 42, at 67 (discussing the broad range of noncitizens subject to
mandatory detention under the IIRIRA). When enacting the IIRIRA, Congress did not provide
specific guidance as to when the INS should detain inadmissible or criminal noncitizens beyond
the ninety-day "removal period." Therefore, under the guidance of the Attorney General the INS
introduced implementing regulations which provided that a non-removable noncitizen could be
released from custody if the noncitizen demonstrated that their release would not pose a danger to
the community or to the safety of other persons or to property or present a significant risk of flight.
The regulations allowed the continued detention of any alien unable to meet that burden. An initial
custody determination, consisting of a review of the alien's records and any written information
submitted on their behalf, was to be conducted prior to the expiration of the ninety-day removal
period in order to determine if such a burden could be met. Under further procedures, if the
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Consequently, challenges to the lengthy and potential indefinite detention
of noncitizens under section 241(a) made their way to the courts. In fact,
by 2001, the INA post-order detention provision had led to the indefinite
detention of some 3400 deportable noncitizens whose home countries
refused to accept them.86 Because of both the increasing number of suits
filed by detained noncitizens and the subsequent split between the federal
circuit courts across the country regarding the constitutionality of indefinite
detention under section 241(a)(6), in October 2000, the U.S. Supreme
Court agreed to take up the issue in order to resolve questions surrounding
the use of indefinite detention.8 7
The decision of the Court in Zadvydas v. Davis" altered the landscape
ofnoncitizen detention law by raising fundamental questions regarding the
scope of Congress's power to authorize the confinement of noncitizens, the
latitude available to the executive branch in enforcing such legislation, and
the level of judicial deference that should be afforded to the judgment of
the political branch on immigration matters, particularly where national
security interests are at stake. 89 Decided less than four months before the
terrorist attacks, the Court's ruling and interpretation of INA section
241(a)(6) in Zadvydas represented the law as it existed in regards to the
detention of noncitizen suspected terrorists as of September 11, 2001.90
B. The MandatoryDetention ofNoncitizen Terrorists in
the United Kingdom Prior to September 11, 2001
The United Kingdom has been dealing with terrorism and the detention
of individuals deemed to pose a threat to its nation long before the United
States even came into existence. 91 While some ofthe U.K. experience with

noncitizen's deportation was not effectuated and no release was granted by the end of the ninetyday period, a subsequent review was mandated "at the expiration of the three-month period after
the ninety-day review or as soon thereafter as practicable." If detention was continued, subsequent
reviews were to be held at least once a year. See Borisov, supra note 53, at 192-93.
86. Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 42, at 1921.
87. See id. at 1923.
88. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
89. See Harvard Law Review, supra note 42, at 1915-16.
90. The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Zadvydas will be discussed in detail in Part
V of this Article.
91. See Bonner, supra note 30, at 172. In addition, while beyond the purview of this Article,
it is important to realize that the problems associated with Ireland and Northern Ireland did not
begin with the partition of the island by the British government in 1920. Celtic tribes originally
settled Ireland and were converted to Catholicism by Saint Patrick around 450 A.D. Since that time,
the majority of Irish have followed the church in Rome. With the beginning of British presence in
Ireland in 1169 and finally with King Henry II's capture ofDublin in 1171, however, there has been
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terrorism resulted from its withdrawal from the colonial empire, since
1968, the principal terrorist threat which has shaped the U.K. response to
terrorism has been connected to the questions surrounding whether
Northern Ireland should remain part of the United Kingdom or whether it
should join the Republic of Ireland. 92 Thus, this part will focus primarily
on the legislation pertaining to the detention of noncitizen suspected
terrorists enacted by the United Kingdom from 1968 until September 11,
2001. In order to better understand the distinct situation of Northern
Ireland which defines the U.K. approach towards terrorism and which has
molded its response to terrorism in the past, however, it is first necessary
to briefly examine both the historical development of the problems of
Northern Ireland as well as the U.K. legislative responses to these troubles.
This will provide a framework for how and why the United Kingdom has
reached its current legislative position.
1. The Division of Ireland and Early British Anti-Terrorism Efforts
In 1920, with the Government of Ireland Act, Britain formally divided
Ireland, establishing separate, subordinate parliaments in Belfast and
Dublin. 93 Despite a short civil war spurred by the Irish Free State's
opposition to the island's partition, the Republic of Ireland was finally
recognized in 1949 with the Republic of Ireland Act. 94 Nevertheless, the
establishment of an independent Ireland did not erase years of resentment
and discord. Many Irish citizens, throughout the country, were not satisfied
with a freedom that did not encompass all of Ireland. 95 Consequently,
during the late 1960s, civil unrest steadily increased in Northern Ireland. 96
The government set up by the British in Northern Ireland, known better as
Stormont, reacted with hostility, either ignoring or rejecting outright the
demands of the protestors. 97 While the protests for reform were initially
nonviolent, seeing that their attempts to improve the conditions of the
minority community in Northern Ireland through political and legal action

strife between the Catholics and Protestants in Ireland and more specifically in Northern Ireland.
See Clark, supra note 3, at 249-52; see generally DONAHUE, supra note 5 (discussing counterterrorism law and emergency powers in the United Kingdom from 1922-2000).
92. See Bonner, supra note 30, at 172-73.
93. Clark, supra note 3, at 252.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 252-53; see also DONAHUE, supra note 5, at 117.
97. See Clark, supra note 3, at 253; see also Oren Gross, "Once More unto the Breach ": The
Systematic Failure of Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched

Emergencies, 23 YALE. J. INT'LL. 437, 475 (1998).
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had largely failed, the Irish citizens who were vehemently opposed to the
idea of a divided Ireland quickly abandoned the tenets of nonviolence.98
Soon thereafter, the British military, at Stormont's request, came to
Northern Ireland in 1969 to assist in patrolling the streets and essentially
replaced the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)99 as the force primarily
responsible for maintaining law and order in the territory.' 00 The situation
culminated in 1972 with the infamous "Bloody Sunday" massacre which
left thirteen unarmed protesters dead at the hands of the British military.' 0
The chaos which followed gave new life to the Irish Republican Army
(IRA) which had remained quiet since the creation of the Free Irish State
and resulted in the indefinite suspension of the Stormont government by
Britain.10 2 It was at this time that the British began the direct rule of
Northern Ireland. 03
In 1973, following the bloodiest year of the "troubles" between
Northern Ireland and Great Britain, the British Parliament enacted the
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 (EPA 1973) which
repealed the Special Powers Act which had been in place since the
partition of Ireland in the 1920s.104 Many of the repealed statute's
provisions were retained in the new legislation."' In addition, the EPA
1973 established the Diplock courts, in which the trial of persons suspected
of certain offenses was to be conducted by one judge, operating under
relaxed rules of evidence and sitting without a jury.' 0 6
Another layer of emergency legislation applying to Northern Ireland
was introduced in 1974 with the enactment of the first Prevention of
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (PTA 1974).107 In contrast to the

98. Clark, supra note 3, at 253.
99. The RUC is the British-backed, Protestant-run police force in Northern Ireland. See Roger
Meyers, A New Remedy for Northern Ireland: The Case for United Nations Peacekeeping

Intervention in an Internal Conflict, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 16 (1990) (discussing
the role of the RUC in Northern Ireland).
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See Gross, supra note 97, at 276; see generally KEVIN BOYLE ET AL., LAW AND STATE:
THE CASEOFNORTHERN IRELAND (1975) (discussing the history of British anti-terrorism legislation
and how it effects on Northern Ireland).
105. See Gross, supra note 97, at 476.
106. See id.; see also Bonner, supra note 30, at 183; Clark, supra note 3, at 256; DONAHUE,
supra note 5, at 123-27; see generally JOHN D. JACKSON & SEAN DORAN, JUDGE WITHOUT JURY:
DIPLOCK TRIALS IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1995) (providing an overview of how the Diplock

court system operates).
107. See Gross, supra note 97, at 476.
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EPA 1973, the PTA 1974's sphere of applicability was not limited to
Northern Ireland but instead encompassed all of the United Kingdom.10
The PTA 1974 essentially replaced the previous legislation, Prevention of
Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act, which was passed by Parliament in
1939 in an effort to deal with an attempt by the IRA to extend their terrorist
campaign to the United Kingdom.' 0 9 After the passing of the 1939 Act,
however, because the IRA lacked a sympathetic community from which to
operate and because of the severe measures imposed by the British
government, its activities diminished." 0 Therefore, similar to the 1939
legislation, the PTA 1974 was introduced at a time where there was
widespread public outrage and demand for greater police action against the
IRA.'" The broad regulatory power of the PTA 1974 included the key antiterrorism provisions which have consistently marked Britain's response to
the unrest in Northern Ireland since the early 1970s.12
The introduction of the PTA 1974 created a dual system of criminal
justice in the United Kingdom." 3 Ordinary criminals suspected of the
pettiest to the most horrific offenses were treated under the ordinary
criminal law while those suspected of terrorism were now dealt with under
the PTA 1974."4 The British government originally intended these
"emergency powers" laws that were only applicable to suspected terrorist
to last for the brief period it took to reestablish order in Northern Ireland."5
That brief period, however, never expired.
The PTA 1974 was based on two different sources, which, in one way
or the other, had been introduced to deal with Irish political violence."' It
drew and expanded upon a number of key elements of the EPA 1973,
particularly the powers of arrest, detention, and proscription and the

108. See id.; see also Clark, supra note 3, at 253-54.

109. See Gross, supra note 97, at 476; DONAHUE, supra note 5, at 35-36; HILLYARD, supra
note 5, at 1-2.
110. See DONAHUE, supra note 5, at 35-36.
111. See HILLYARD, supra note 5, at 1.
112. See Gross, supra note 97, at 476; see also Bonner, supra note 30, at 179. Prior to the
passing of the PTA and the EPA the regulations which governed the detention of suspected
terrorists were found under the 1922-43 Special Powers Acts (SPA). Although the government
immediately announced its intent to repeal the 1922-43 SPA and Regulations and to replace them
with new emergency legislation, the resultant EPA and the PTA did not so much revoke the
previous statutes as simply rename them and expand them. Additionally, while the EPA sphere of
applicability was limited to Northern Ireland, the PTA was generally applicable throughout the
United Kingdom. See DONAHUE, supra note 5, at 130.
113. See HILLYARD, supra note 5, at 68.
114. See id.
115. See Clark, supra note 3, at 254.
116. See HILLYARD, supra note 5, at 2.
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Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act 1939, which had been
introduced to deal with a previous campaign of the IRA."' The PTA 1974
provided the police with extended and expansive powers of arrest and
detention and gave them new powers to control the movement of persons
entering and leaving Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This new
legislation swiftly became subsumed into British law."' Soon after these
acts were enacted, the burden shifted from those supporting emergency
measures to prove that they were imperative, to individuals seeking to
repeal the legislation needing to demonstrate that an emergency no longer
existed." 9 In other words, the purported temporary nature ofthe emergency
measures seemed to be long forgotten, as emergency measures slowly
became the rule rather than the exception in Northern Ireland. While there
were various reviews and minor amendments to both the EPA 1973 and
the PTA 1974 between 1974 and 2000, these amendments were largely
centered on cosmetic alterations to the existing statutes, leaving the vast
majority of the provisions included in the amended versions of the EPA
and the PTA still intact. 2 0 Few new powers were introduced and even
fewer existing powers were relinquished. Over this period of time, a
blending of the EPA and the PTA and a more detailed consideration of
permanent counter-terrorist law emerged.' 2 ' The gradual merger of these
provisions ultimately resulted in the passing of the Terrorism Act 2000 in
March 2001. Before discussing the Terrorism Act 2000 and the law as it
pertained to the United Kingdom as of September 11, 2001, however, in
an effort to better understand the changes that the Terrorism Act 2000

made, it is first essential to provide a brief history of the arrest and
detention provisions as they existed prior to the passing of this piece of
legislation.
2. Anti-Terrorism Law in the United Kingdom from 1973-2000
The "emergency powers" laws initiated with the passing of the EPA
1973 and the PTA 1974 granted extremely broad discretion to both the
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the British military in investigations
of suspected terrorist activity in Northern Ireland.1 22 The PTA 1974
authorized law enforcement to arrest anyone without a warrant where it
had reasonable grounds for suspecting that the arrested individual was
117. See id.
118. See id. at 4; see also DONAHUE, supra note 5, at 258.
119. See DONAHUE, supra note 5, at 258.

120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See Clark, supra note 3, at 254.
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guilty of some offense under the legislation or if the individual was or had
been concerned in the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of
terrorism in connection with Northern Ireland affairs or international
terrorism. 3 The police, therefore, were permitted to stop an individual on
the street and question him regarding his identity and recent movements. 124
The provisions also permitted the RUC or the British military to search an
individual's premises and seize any possessions based upon the low
threshold "reasonable suspicion" of terrorist activity.15 Furthermore,
anything found during a warrantless search could be confiscated if the law
enforcement believed the item was somehow connected to a crime.1 26
In addition, the PTA 1974 authorized the arrest and detention of
suspects for questioning without trial.1 7 The RUC was authorized to arrest
and detain an individual for an initial period of forty-eight hours, which
would then be extended to an additional five-day period upon the
authorization of Northern Ireland's Secretary of State, all without formal
charges or an appearance before a magistrate.128 The total length of
detention could not, however, exceed seven days.1 2 9 Because the prime
objective of all the PTAs had never been the pursuit of a prosecution but
instead the pursuit of intelligence gathering in an effort to defeat terrorism,
the RUC usually ended up releasing a majority of those they detained
without ever charging them. 3 0
A review procedure for the detention of suspected terrorists was
introduced in an amendment to the PTA in 1989. This procedure required
an initial review to be carried out as soon as practicable after the beginning
of the detention and that subsequent reviews would be carried out at
twelve-hour intervals.' 3 ' The reviews, however, could be postponed if it
was not practicable to carry them out because the person was being

123. HILLYARD, supra note 5, at 68.
124. Clark, supra note 3, at 254.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 254-55.
129. See HILLYARD, supra note 5, at 76.
130. See id at 93. In fact, as of 1993, of 7052 people who had been detained in connection
with Northern Ireland affairs under the PTA, over 6097, or 86%, were released without any action
being taken against them. These numbers demonstrate how great of an abuse of power the PTA was
in terms of the detention of suspected terrorists. The arrest and detention powers under the PTA
were instead used by the police essentially to screen the Irish community and seek out terrorists.
See id at 5, 90, 93.
131. See id. at 75.
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questioned or if no review officer was readily available.'13 The detention
could be continued only if it was necessary to obtain or preserve evidence
specifically related to the offences under the Act or if the individual was
thought to be involved in terrorist activities.' 33 What was so striking about
this review procedure is that under the amended PTA, a person could be
held for up to seven days without any outside assessment. 3 4 The detainee
only had a right to make representations to the review officer. 3
Finally, prior to the 1989 amendment there were no rules governing
how long a person detained under the PTA could be held without being
permitted to contact a friend or a lawyer. After 1989, however, suspected
terrorists were permitted to have one person informed of their detention
situation as soon as practicable.1 36 Often this concession was delayed if
there were reasonable grounds for believing that alerting someone as to an
individual's detention would interfere with the gathering of information
about the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism or
because it would make it more difficult to prevent an act of terrorism or to
secure the conviction of someone involved. 3 7
3. The Terrorism Act 2000
The purportedly temporary legislation of the PTA and the EPA was
replaced with the Terrorism Act 2000. This piece of legislation reformed
and extended the aforementioned counter-terrorist legislation, and did so
on a largely permanent basis.3 3 The Terrorism Act 2000 came into effect
in early 2001 and applied to noncitizen terrorist groups as well as domestic
terrorist groups, and was the sole responsibility of the Home Secretary.
Therefore, as discussed earlier in this part, the Terrorism Act 2000, unlike
other anti-terrorism measures like the PTA and the EPA, did not require
annual Parliamentary review. Specifically, the Act (1) prohibited fundraising and other kinds of financial support for terrorism, together with
power for a court to order forfeiture of any money or other property
connected with the offenses; (2) provided the police with powers to arrest
and detain suspected terrorists, and broader powers to stop and search
vehicles and pedestrians, and to impose parking restrictions; (3) provided

132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See HILLYARD, supra note 5, at 76.
135. See id.
136. See id at 77.
137. See id.
138. See John R. Burroughs et al., Public InternationalLaw: Arms Control and National
Security, 36 INT'L LAW. 471, 484 (2002).
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examination powers at ports and borders; (4) provided for the treatment of
suspects who are detained and for judicial extension of the initial period of
detention; (5) proscribed weapons training for terrorist purposes, including

recruitment for such training; and (6) proscribed the directing of a terrorist

'

organization, possessing articles for terrorist purposes, possessing
information for terrorist purposes, and incitement of overseas terrorism.' 39
The Terrorism Act 2000 was presciently enacted by the United Kingdom
in an effort to both expand its power to combat terrorism ahead of the
September 11, 2001 attacks, as well as to provide some permanency to the
U.K. counter-terrorism law.
In addition, the Terrorism Act 2000 repealed previous anti-terrorism
measures and adopted a wider definition of terrorism, recognizing that
terrorism may have religious or ideological, as well as political motivation,
and covered actions which might not be violent in themselves but which
can, in a modern society, have a devastating impact.140 These could include
interfering with the supply of water or power where life, health, or safety
may be put at risk, and the disrupting of key computer systems.1 4
The Terrorism Act 2000 was less than a year old when the attacks of
September 11, 2001 occurred. Therefore, the full effects of the Act's
detention provisions were never fully realized and instead have been
amended and expanded on by the ATCSA, as will be examined closely in
Part IV of this Article.

IV. DETENTION UNDER THE UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY
PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND

OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT OF 2001 AND THE ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME
AND SECURITY ACT 2001

Just six weeks after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress
passed the Patriot Act - a sweeping anti-terrorism bill which, among
other things, broadened the definition of "terrorist" and gave law
enforcement officials expansive new powers to detain and prosecute
accused terrorists.1 42 A number of the Patriot Act's provisions are
uncontroversial and in fact were welcomed by the public during a time they

139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.

142. See Regina Germain, Rushing to Judgment: The Unintended Consequences of the USA
PatriotAct for Bona Fide Refugees, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 505, 505 (2002).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol16/iss2/5

28

2004]

OR INSECURITY?
SECURITY
NAME
OF NATIONAL
IN THE of
Keith: In the Name
National
Security
or Insecurity?:
The Potential In

433

felt most vulnerable to international terrorism. 1"3 The Act, nevertheless,
stands out as radical in the degree in which it sacrifices political freedoms
in the name of national security and consolidates new powers in the
executive branch.'4 The particular provisions at the center of this Article,
sections 411 and 412,'45 which when acting together have been widely
criticized as depriving noncitizens of their due process and First

Amendment rights, mandate the detention of noncitizens suspected of
terrorism.' 46 Section 411 greatly expands the class of noncitizens who are
subject to deportation on grounds of terrorism through its expanded
definitions of the terms "terrorist activity," "engage in terrorist activity,"
and "terrorist organization. "'14 Section 412 substantially enlarges the
authority of the Attorney General to place noncitizens he suspects engage
in terrorist activities in detention while their deportation proceedings are
pending.' 41
The ATCSA is the U.K. counterpart to the Patriot Act. Passed in
December 2001 in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks in the
United States, the ATCSA increases the British government's power to
prevent noncitizen suspected terrorists from abusing the immigration laws
of the United Kingdom. Like the Patriot Act, the ATCSA has been widely
criticized because it is comprised of unusually coercive powers.' 4 9 In
contrast to the Patriot Act, however, the ATCSA was not passed in

143. For example, other provisions of the Act provide for such things as increased funding for
counter-terrorism activities, particularly for increased border protection, condemnation of
discrimination against Arab and Muslim Americans, preservation of immigration benefits for
victims, and direct assistance for victims and their families. See Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT)
Act 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, §§ 101-103, 402, 404, 421-427 (to be codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). For a complete discussion of federal initiatives in
response to the September 11 terrorist attacks see Jan C. Ting, Unobjectionable but
Insufficient-FederalInitiativesin Response to the September 11 TerroristAttacks, 34 CONN. L.
REV. 1145 (2002).
144. See NANCY CHANG, SILENCING POLmCAL DISSENT 43-4 (2002).

145. USA PATRIOT Act §§ 411,412(2001) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C.).
146. See CHANG, supra note 144, at 62.
147. See USA PATRIOT Act § 411 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
148. See id. § 412 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
149. See generally Trevor Aldridge, End of the Affair, SOLICrrORS J., Jan. 18, 2002, at 31
(arguing that the ATCSA is the antithesis of freedom and civil liberty); Big Brother's Watching
You, SOLICITORS J., Dec. 21, 2001, at 1174 (arguing that the ATCSA will make the United
Kingdom a less democratic place); Josh Wadham, Out of Proportion, SOLICITOR'S J., Nov. 23,
2001, at 1074 (discussing the detention provisions of the ATCSA and arguing that they are
disproportional to the situation in the United Kingdom).
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response to any widely-perceived public emergency in the United
Kingdom. The attacks of September 11 were isolated events perpetrated
against the United States. There have been no attacks against the United
Kingdom and, in fact, the attacks of September 11 did not deliberately
target Britons.150 Furthermore, as will be discussed below, the ATCSA

takes the detention ofnoncitizens suspected of terrorism a step further than
authorized by the Patriot Act. While most of the Act was accepted without
much argument, a small number of provisions provoked enormous
controversy. Prior to the enactment of the provisions under part 4 of the
ATCSA, the United Kingdom basically had three options for dealing with
suspected noncitizen terrorists: (1) deport them to a safe third country; (2)
prosecute them under existing U.K. law; or (3) let them go free.1'5 Section
23 of the ATCSA gives the government yet another option: potential
indefinite detention to prevent the suspected noncitizen terrorist from
engaging in any future terrorist activities which may be detrimental to the
United Kingdom. 5 2
The most controversial provisions of the ATCSA, contained in part 4,'53
will be outlined here. Part 4, and more specifically, sections 21-33 of the
ATCSA, lay out the powers of the Secretary of State to certify people as
"suspected international terrorists" and "national security risks" and for
their consequent detention without charge or trial for an unspecified and
potentially unlimited period of time.
As Part III of this Article explained, September 11, 2001 did not mark
the introduction of terrorism to the governments and people of the United
States and the United Kingdom. Each country had previously encountered
acts of terrorism and had responded to terrorism and terrorist threats
through various pieces of legislation, albeit differently. The September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks were different, though. The precise planning and
hatred that characterized the attacks and the overall destruction left in their
wake was unlike anything either nation had seen before. This part will
examine and compare the legislative responses of both nations to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. More specifically, this part will
focus on and outline the specific measures of each of these pieces of
legislation which allow for the potential indefinite detention ofnoncitizens.

150. Jonathan L. Black-Branch, Powers of Detention of Suspected International Terrorists
under the United Kingdom Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: Dismantling the
Cornerstones of a Civil Society, 27 EUR. L. REv. 19, 26 (2002).
151. See Henning, supra note 6, at 1269.
152. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, § 23.
153. Id. §§ 21-36.
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Through this comparison, it becomes apparent how restrained the U.S.
legal response to the terrorist acts of September 11 appears. Finally, this
part will analyze the outlined detention provisions and discuss the potential
problems which are almost certain to arise in enforcing both of these pieces
of legislation.
A. Expanding the Definition of Terrorism
1. Section 411 of the Patriot Act
Section 411 of the Patriot Act imposes guilt by association on
noncitizens by vastly expanding the class of noncitizens that can be
removed on terrorist grounds. Before September 11, the term "terrorist
activity" was commonly understood to be limited to premeditated and
politically-motivated violence targeted against a civilian population." 4
Section 411, however, stretches that term to encompass any crime that
involves the use of "a weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere
personal monetary gain)."' Under this expansive definition, a noncitizen
who grabs a knife or a provisional weapon in any type of heat-of themoment altercation may be deemed removable as a "terrorist."1 56
In addition, the term "engage in terrorist activity" has also been
expanded to include soliciting funds for, soliciting membership for, and
providing material support to a "terrorist organization" even when that
organization has legitimate political and humanitarian ends and the
noncitizen seeks only to support these lawful ends.'" Prior to September
11, noncitizens were deportable for engaging in or supporting terrorist
activity, but not for mere association. Noncitizens could be deported for
providing material support to an organization only if they knew or
reasonably should have known that their activity would support the
organization "in conducting a terrorist activity."" 8 Section 411 of the
Patriot Act, however, eliminates that nexus requirement. It makes
noncitizens deportable for wholly innocent associational activity with a
"terrorist organization," whether or not there is any connection between the

154. See CHANG, supra note 144, at 62.
155. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, § 411(a)
(to be codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182).
156. See CHANG, supra note 144, at 62.

157. USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a) (to be codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182).
158. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § I I82(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000)).
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noncitizen's associational conduct and any act of violence, much less
terrorism.' 5 9
Furthermore, the definition of the term "terrorist organization" has been
expanded to include groups that have never before been designated as
terrorist if they are composed of "two or more individuals, whether
organized or not," who engage in specified terrorist activities. 160 Therefore,
under this law, in a situation in which a noncitizen has solicited funds for,
solicited membership for, or provided material support to an undesignated
"terroristorganization," section 411 imposes on him the difficult burden
of "demonstrat[ing] that he did not know, and should not have reasonably
known, that the act would further the organization's terrorist activity."''
For example, if an unsuspecting noncitizen donates money to a charity that
is held to be a terrorist organization, the seemingly innocent act of giving
by the noncitizen may very well serve as a ground for removal.1 2
While the First Amendment implications of section 411 of the Patriot
Act are beyond the scope of this Article, it should be noted that by
redefining the definitions of terrorist activity and terrorist organization, the

159. USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a) (to be codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182). The Patriot
Act defines a deportable offense as the solicitation of members or funds for, or the provision of
material support to any terrorist group. There is no defense available, not even for those who can
show that their support had no connection to furthering terrorism. The government is free to
designate any organization that uses or threatens to use violence as a terrorist organization. In
addition, the law makes noncitizens who support even non-designated groups deportable if the
group has engaged in or threatened violence, unless the noncitizen can prove that he neither knew
nor reasonably should have known that his support would further the group's terrorist activities.
See id. Because § 411 appears to redefine and enlarge the elements of the probable cause
requirement for arrest, the statute has also been attacked as being in violation of a noncitizen's
Fourth Amendment rights. An examination of the Fourth Amendment implications of the Patriot
Act is outside the scope of this Article but has been addressed extensively elsewhere. See, e.g.,
Sharon H. Rackow, How the USA PatriotAct Will Permit Governmental Infringement Upon the
Privacy ofAmericans in the Name of "Intelligence "Investigations, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1651(2002)
(discussing how the Patriot Act broadened the government's right to engage in electronic
surveillance); John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for
"Homeland Security": A Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice
Department's Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081 (2002) (providing an in-depth

analysis of several of the constitutional concerns which are raised by the Patriot Act).
160. USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a) (to be codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182).
161. Id. To qualify as an undesignated "terrorist organization" under 8 U.S.C. §
I I82(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III), "a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not," must engage
in one or more of the "terroristactivities" outlined in 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(I)-(III). Id.
162. In addition, the Patriot Act's proscription on associational activity potentially
encompasses every organization that has even been involved in a civil war or a crime of violence,
from a pro-life group that once threatened workers at an abortion clinic to the Irish Republican
Army. See Cole, supra note 5, at 967.
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Patriot Act also resurrects the notion of an ideological exclusion - the act
of denying entry to noncitizens for pure speech.'1 3 Section 411 bars
admission to noncitizens who "endorse or espouse terrorist activity," or
who "persuade others to support terrorist activity a terrorist organization,"
in ways determined by the Secretary of State to undermine U.S. efforts to
combat terrorism.'" It also excludes noncitizens who are representatives

of groups that "endorse acts of terrorist activity" in ways that similarly
undermine U.S. efforts to combat terrorism.' 5 It is well-established that
citizens have a constitutional right to endorse terrorist organizations or

terrorist activity, so long as their speech is not intended and likely to
produce imminent lawless action.' 66 While the U.S. Supreme Court has
ruled that noncitizens that have yet to procure entry into the United States
have limited constitutional rights,' 7 these ideological exclusions
nevertheless raise constitutional concerns. The First Amendment is
designed to protect free public debate and in keeping out those persons
who voice unpopular beliefs, the opportunity of U.S. citizens to hear and
consider those ideas may be diminished.' 6' Excluding people for their ideas
stands in stark contrast to the spirit of political freedom for which the
United States stands and which we are deeply resolved to protect in
response to the September 11 attacks.' 9
2. Terrorist Status under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act
The core of the U.K.'s Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act
(ATCSA) is contained in part 4 which addresses immigration and asylum.
Part 4 allows suspected international terrorists to be deported from or
imprisoned in the United Kingdom.' The Secretary of State may certify
that anyone is a suspected international terrorist if he reasonably believes
that the person's presence in the United Kingdom is a risk to national
security and that the person is a terrorist."' This is similar to the power of

163. See id. at 970.
164. USA PATRIOT Act § 411 (to be codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182).
165. See id
166. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
167. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (stating that a noncitizen outside
the United States does not have a First Amendment right to contest his exclusion); United States
ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (ruling that noncitizens outside the borders of
the United States do not have a constitutional right to enter).
168. See Cole, supra note 5, at 970.
169. See id. at 971.
170. See generallyAnti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 §§ 21-36 (containing those
provisions which make up part 4 of the ATCSA dealing with immigration and asylum).
171. Id. § 21.
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the Attorney General under the Patriot Act to certify a noncitizen as a
terrorist. 7 2 In contrast to the limits placed on the Attorney General's power
under the Patriot Act in regards to the amount of time he has to commence
proceedings against the detained noncitizen, there is no such limitation
placed on the Secretary of State in Britain. As discussed above, under
section 412 of the Patriot Act, the Attorney General is required to place a
detained noncitizen either in removal proceedings or to charge him with a
criminal offense within seven days after the commencement of detention.
If the preceding requirement is not satisfied, the Attorney General must
release the noncitizen. Under the ATCSA, however, there is no similar
limitation placed on the Secretary of State to detain an individual. Thus,
even prior to certification, a noncitizen could potentially be detained for an
indefinite amount of time.
Under the ATCSA, the all-important word "terrorist" is defined as "a
person who (a) is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation,

or instigation of acts of international terrorism, (b) is a member or belongs
to an international terrorist group, or (c) has links with an international
terrorist group." 7 7 This definition provides for the power of certification
of a person as a suspected international terrorist. 7 4 The last of these criteria
is potentially extremely broad and vague and the government came under
pressure from the Parliament to clarify the phrase "links with."'" In
response, the government narrowed the scope of the phrase by offering the
following definition: "a person has links with an international terrorist
group only if he supports or assists it."176 Thus, the expanded definition of
a terrorist under the ATCSA is comparable to that under the Patriot Act
which now makes noncitizens deportable as terrorist for wholly innocent
associational activity with a "terrorist organization," regardless whether
there is any connection between the noncitizen's associational conduct and
any act of violence, much less terrorism.' 7
The term "terrorism" in this section of the ATCSA has the same
meaning as in the Terrorism Act 2000, section 1. This definition is broad
and includes:

172. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, § 411 (to
be codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182).
173. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act § 21.
174. See id.; see also Tomkins, supranote 6, at 211.
175. Tomkins, supra note 6, at 211.
176. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act § 21.
177. Cf USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a) (to be codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182).
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the use or threat of action. .. designed to influence the government
or to intimidate the public . . . for the purpose of advancing a
political, religious, or ideological cause ... which involves serious
violence against a person or serious damage to property, endangers
a person's life, creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the
public, or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to
disrupt an electronic system." 8
By seeking to merely influence the government, rather than seeking to
intimidate or coerce the government, and by expanding the definition of

terrorism to encompass the most serious violence, the distinction between
terrorism and other criminal activity governed by regular public order law
instead of special provisions ofterrorism law, has become blurred. 7 9 Thus,
the potential reach of this provision of part 4 concerning suspected
noncitizen terrorists is considerable. This is important because although
granting extraordinary powers to the state during times of emergency may
be justified, the availability of these powers must be limited to situations
where it is absolutely necessary and even then only in carefully defined and
specified circumstances. 8 0 The problem is that the United Kingdom has
not satisfied these criteria in passing the ATCSA.
When compared to the Patriot Act, the definition of terrorism under the
ATCSA appears to be expansive but noticeably less vague. Under the
Patriot Act, the term "terrorist activity" has been stretched to include any
crime that involves the use of "a weapon or dangerous device (other than
for mere personal monetary gain)."' Thus, while the definition under both
pieces of legislation increases the types of activity which will be
considered terrorist acts, the definition under the ATCSA more clearly
articulates exactly what acts will fall under the Act's definition. Each
definition, however, is open to similar types of abuse.
B. Detention of CertifiedIndividuals
1. Section 412 of the Patriot Act
At the same time that section 411 expands the class of noncitizens who
are deportable on grounds of terrorism, section 412 inflates the Attorney
General's power to detain noncitizens who are suspected of terrorism and

178.
179.
180.
181.

Terrorism Act 2000, ch. 11, § 1.
See Tomkins, supra note 6, at 211-12.
See id at 212.
USA PATRIOT Act § 411 (to be codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
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radically revises the rules governing detention of noncitizens.' Prior to
September 11, 2001, noncitizens in removal proceedings were subject to
preventative detention under essentially the same standards that apply to
defendants in criminal proceedings - they could be detained without bond
if they posed a danger to the community or a risk of flight.' If the
government could not make such a showing in a hearing before an
immigration judge, noncitizens were entitled to release on bond. 8 4
Conversely, Section 412 of the Patriot Act authorizes the Attorney
General to detain noncitizens without a hearing and without showing that
they pose a threat to national security or a flight risk.' He need only
certify that he "has reasonable grounds to believe" that a noncitizen is
engaged in terrorist activity or in any other activity endangering the
national security of the United States, and the noncitizen is then subject to
potentially indefinite mandatory detention.186
Following certification by the Attorney General, a noncitizen suspected
of terrorist activity must be taken into custody and may be held without
charge of a criminal or immigration violation for up to seven days.187 To
continue detention beyond seven days, the government must either begin
deportation proceedings or bring criminal charges against the noncitizen.' 88
If the government fails to do so, the noncitizen must be released.' 9 For a
noncitizen against whom the government initiates deportation proceedings,
detention must continue, even if the noncitizen is granted relief from
removal, until the Attorney General decertifies him.1 90 If the certified
noncitizen is deemed removable and his removal is unlikely in the
"reasonably foreseeable future," he may be detained for an additional

182. See CHANG, supra note 144, at 64; Cole, supra note 5, at 971.
183. Cole, supra note 5, at 971.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a)(3) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a). In addition, because
the definition of "engage in terrorist activity" have been defined so broadly as to include the use
of, or threat to use, a weapon with intent to endanger person or property, it would encompass a
noncitizen who used a kitchen knife in a domestic dispute with her abusive husband, or a noncitizen
who found themselves in a bar fight, picked up a bottle, and threatened another person with it.
Clearly, not all such persons pose a danger or flight risk necessitating mandatory preventative
detention; nevertheless the Patriot Act empowers the Attorney General to detain such persons
without even proving that they pose a danger or flight risk. See supra text accompanying note 4;
see also Cole, supra note 5, at 971.

187.
188.
189.
190.

USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a)(5) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 412(a)(2) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol16/iss2/5

§ 1226a).

36

20041

THE NAME
OF NA TIONAL
SECURlTY
INSECURITY? The Potential In
Keith: In theINName
of National
Security
orOR
Insecurity?:

441

period of up to six months if his release would "threaten the national
security of the United States or the safety of the community or any
person."' 9' If the noncitizen is ultimately determined not to be removable,
however, he must be released.' 92
Section 412 also requires the Attorney General to review the detention
of noncitizens certified under the Act every six months and to report to the
Congress on the number of aliens certified, their nationality, the grounds

for certification, and the duration of detention.'

93

In addition, certified

individuals who are detained under the Patriot Act do have access to
judicial review.' 4 Detainees are allowed to initiate habeas corpus
proceedings in any district court having jurisdiction.' 5 Appeals from
unfavorable decisions, however, are limited and more difficult to obtain
than prior to September 11, 2001. Appeals may be made only to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the law which must be
applied in such cases is limited to the law applied by that court or the U.S.
Supreme Court.' 6
2. Detention Under the ATCSA
The most significant power which the state now has under part 4 of the
ATCSA pertaining to suspected international terrorists is the authority of
the Secretary of State to detain a certified suspected noncitizen terrorist
indefinitely without trial.' 7 This is easily distinguishable from the Patriot
Act which explicitly provides for proceedings, either removal or criminal,
to be commenced against the noncitizen within seven days of their
apprehension as well as providing for judicial review of any decision to
certify an individual as a terrorist. Conversely, under section 23 of the

191. Id. § 412(a)(6) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a). This section has been extremely
controversial because while the Patriot Act appears to state that the longest possible detention is
six months, the explicit language only requires the Attorney General to review the certification
every six months. Thus, the language of the statute seems to permit a noncitizen to be subject to
indefinite detention provided that the Attorney General reviews his certification every six months
and determines that the certification should not be revoked. Thus, while there is a cap of seven days
on the initial detention period under section 412(a)(5), once detained for a removal proceeding of
criminal charge, this period is ultimately redefined to the extent that the noncitizen cannot be
removed and continues to be certified based on reasonable grounds to believe that the noncitizen
poses a risk to national security. See id. § 412(a)(6), (7) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a).
192. USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a)(2) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a).
193. Id. § 412(c) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a).
194. Id. § 412(b) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001,
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ATCSA, a suspected noncitizen terrorist may be detained indefinitely if his
removal from the United Kingdom is prevented either by a point of law or
by a practical consideration." This last point deserves some further
explanation.
There are two primary reasons why the deportation or removal of a nonBritish national from the United Kingdom may prove difficult. First,
removal or deportation from the United Kingdom could be prevented by,
for example, the fact that the individual concerned may be a stateless
person or because the U.K. authorities are unable to find another country
willing to accept him or her. '' The very fact that the individual has been
certified by the Secretary of State as a suspected terrorist may make finding
another country an extremely frustrating task. 200
Second, the U.K. government may also be prevented from effecting a
removal or deportation of anyone certified as a suspected terrorist as a
result of the U.K. obligations under article 3 of European Commission on
Human Rights. 20 1 In Chalal v. UnitedKingdom,202 the European Court of
Human Rights ruled that the British government's attempt to deport an
individual who had been detained pending deportation to India on
"national security" grounds was in violation of the ECHR.203 Chahal was
an Indian Sikh who had entered the United Kingdom illegally and was
detained pending deportation, but feared return to India because of his
previous Sikh separatist activities. The European Court, in interpreting the
ECHR, found that article 3 protected one of the most fundamental values
of democratic society in that it prohibits in absolute terms torture, or
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim's
conduct, and that article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no
derogation from it is permissible. 204 Adhering to this interpretation, the
European Court held that the prohibition of torture contained in article 3
of the ECHR was absolute and that allegations of national security risk

198. See id.
199. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S MEMORANDUM TO THE UK
GOVERNMENT ON PART 4 OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY ACT 2001, Sept. 5, 2002,

available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR450172002?open&of=ENG-GBR(last
visited June 29, 2004).
200. See id.
201. See id. Article 3 of the ECHR states "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment." ECHR, supra note 13, art. 3.
202. 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 413 (1997).
203. See id. at 446.
204. See id. at 414.
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were immaterial to a determination of whether a person faced a "real risk"
of torture if returned.20
Another extremely important aspect of section 23 of the ATCSA is the
U.K. derogation from article 5 of the ECHR, so as to ensure that the
provisions contained in part 4 ofthe new legislation do not violate the U.K.
obligations under article 5 of the ECHR. 206 While article 5(1)(f) of the
ECHR permits the lawful "detention of a person to prevent his effecting an
unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against who action is
being taken with a view to deportation," 207 because the government intends
to detain even those individuals who are not subject to removal
proceedings, 208 this article will not save all detentions which the
government proposes under this provision. 209 Therefore, to enable the
ATCSA to be passed, the British government was forced to formally
derogate under article 15 of the ECHR from article 5(1) of the ECHR
which relates to the detention of a person where there is an intention to
remove or deport him from the United Kingdom. 210

205. See id. at 446.
206. See Khan, supra note 6, at I1. Article 5 of the ECHR provides that "Everyone has the
right to liberty and security of person." ECHR, supra note 13, art. 5. This provision has consistently
been ruled by the European Court of Human Rights to reinforce the fundamental duty of member
states to respect the right of all human being to their physical security. See MARK JANIS ET AL.,
EUROPEAN HuMAN RIGrs LAW 309 (2000).
207. ECHR, supra note 13, art. 5(1)(f).
208. The reason why the government would choose to detain someone instead of deporting
them is the result of Britain's obligations under article 3 of the ECHR. The European Court of
Human Rights has consistently held that it is a violation of article 3 for a state to deport a person
where "substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question, if expelled,
would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment in contrary to article 3 in the receiving
county." Unlike article 5, article 3 is one of the few provisions of the ECHR which is absolute and
which states cannot derogate from. See Tomkins, supra note 6, at 212-13.
209. Id. at 212. As the European Court of Human Rights held in Chahal, "any depravation of
liberty under Article 5(1)(f) will be justified only for as long as deportation proceedings are in
progress. If such proceedings are not prosecuted with due diligence, the detention will cease to be
permissible." See Chahal, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 417.
210. Khan, supra note 6, at 11. Article 15(1) of the ECHR provides that "in time of war or
other public emergency threatening the life of the nation, any High Contracting Party may take
measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by
the exigencies of the situation. . . .". See id. The British government has not claimed that this is a
"time of war" and thus, the basis of its derogation is that this is a time of "public emergency." The
question which therefore must be contemplated is whether the various requirements of article 15(1)
are met here. More specifically, is there currently a public emergency which threatened the life of
the United Kingdom and if so, are the measures contained in the ATCSA strictly required by the
exigencies of this emergency? See id. These questions and the validity of the U.K. derogation will
be discussed in more depth in Part V of this Article.
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What also clearly distinguishes the ATCSA from the Patriot Act is that
it excludes regular judicial review of the Secretary of State's decisions and
actions under both section 21 (certification of a person as a suspected
terrorist) and section 23 (indefinite detention without trial of a suspected
terrorist).2 " As previously discussed, under section 412 of the Patriot Act,
a noncitizen detained as a certified terrorist has the ability to obtain judicial
review of his detention. This review is available exclusively in habeas
corpus proceedings and applies to any noncitizen subject to detention
under the Patriot Act. Conversely, the ATCSA provides that such decisions
and actions may only be questioned in legal proceedings before the Special
Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC). 212
The SIAC was established by Parliament in 1997 to entertain certain
appeals against immigration and deportation decisions which have been
taken on national security grounds. 2 The SIAC enjoys the status of a
superior court of record - one of the effects of which is that it is not
subject to additional judicial review. 214 In a proceeding before the SIAC,
the appellant has his legal representative chosen by the government, and
this person is not responsible to the appellant. 2 Furthermore, the
proceedings before the SIAC may be held in the absence of the appellant
and/or his lawyer and the proceedings may occur without the appellant
being fully aware of the reasons for the decisions which have been made
with regards to him.2 16 Therefore, unlike section 412 of the Patriot Act,
there are no explicit provisions under the ATCSA providing those arrested
and detained under the Act with the right to bring proceedings to have a
court determine quickly the lawfulness of the detention, and order release
if the detention is deemed unlawful. The fundamental safeguard of habeas
corpus present in the Patriot Act therefore does not protect noncitizens
suspected of terrorism against arbitrary detention under the ATCSA.

211. Id. at 217.
212. See Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, §§ 21, 25.
213. See Tomkins, supra note 6, at 217. The SIAC was established in order to bring U.K. law
into conformity with article 5(4) of the ECHR following the decision of the European Court of
Human Rights in Chahal. See Chahal, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 448-49. Before, the sorts of decisions
which now come before the SIAC could be reviewed only by an advisory panel in which applicants
were not entitled to legal representation and were given only an outline of the grounds for the
Secretary of State's decision. Furthermore, the panel's recommendations were neither binding on
the Secretary of State nor disclosed to the applicant. See Special Immigration Appeals Commission
Act 1997.
214. See Zander, supra note 6, at 1880.
215. Tomkins, supra note 6, at 217-18.
216. Id. at 218.
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Operating within the procedural constraints ofthe SIAC, limited review
of sections 21-23 is, however, available under the ATCSA. 2 'Nevertheless,
as discussed above, unlike the Patriot Act, there is no explicit provision of
the ATCSA which requires the Secretary of State to commence
proceedings within a certain period of time. A noncitizen could therefore
be held for a considerable amount of time without being charged with any
type of immigration violation or criminal activity. Thus, while the SIAC
is permitted to hear appeals against certification decisions under section
21,21 a noncitizen could be held for a long period of time before even
being certified. The rules governing appeals to the SIAC require that all

appeals be brought within three months of the certification and the SIAC
is required to cancel a certification if it considers that there are no
reasonable grounds for suspecting the person to be a terrorist. 219 With no
limit on how long a noncitizen can be held without being certified as a
terrorist, however, an individual could be detained arbitrarily without a
chance for judicial review for a period longer than three months. The SIAC
is also required to conduct a review of every certificate issued under
section 21 once the suspected terrorist has been in detention for six
months." Cancellation of a certification by the SIAC, however, "shall not
prevent the Secretary of State from issuing another certificate."22 Thus, the
SIAC appears to have little authority to overrule a decision of the Secretary
of State to certify a noncitizen as a terrorist.
Despite the overall extraordinary power of detention without trial which
is placed into the hands of the state, there are two safeguards contained
within the ATCSA, which purport to protect against arbitrary detention by
the government. First, section 28 requires there to be a review of the
operation of sections 21-23 by a person to be appointed by the Secretary
of State.2 2 2 This review must be conducted within fourteen months of the
Act's coming into force. 2 3 This review is somewhat similar to the
requirement under section 412 of the Patriot Act which requires the
Attorney General to submit reports to various government committees on
the number of noncitizens who are being affected by the Act's detention

217. Id.
218. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, § 25.
219. Id.
220. Id. § 26. Additionally, identical to the appeals procedure under section 25, if on a review
under section 26 the SIAC determines that there are no reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
person concerned is a terrorist within the meaning of the Act, the SIAC must cancel the
certification.
221. Id. § 27.
222. Id. § 28.
223. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act § 28.
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provisions. Second, section 29 requires that sections 21-23 expire within
fifteen months after the Act's coming into force, although the Secretary of
State retains the power to revive them.22 4 Furthermore, section 29(7)
provides that sections 21-23 will cease to have effect altogether five years

after the Act's coming into force and in order to revive these provisions a
further act of Parliament would be required.22 5
C. Criticism of the Patriot Act and the ATCSA's Detention Measures
1. The Patriot Act
While Congress's incorporation ofjudicial review and time limitations
into the detention provisions of the Patriot Act purport to eliminate the
potential for indefinite mandatory detention, it has been alleged that these
safeguards may not go far enough. 226 Even with the limits placed on the
executive branch's authority to implement immigration policy, the
detention provisions contained in the Patriot Act undoubtedly raise serious
constitutional concerns.
First, and most notably, the detention provisions have been argued to
violate a noncitizen's due process rights. 227 By giving the Attorney General
the authority to detain a noncitizen based upon a reasonable suspicion of
"terroristactivity" broadly conceived, the language of the statute appears
impermissibly vague.2 28 Though decided before the Patriot Act was
enacted, the recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in City of Chicago
v. Morales,2 29 best illustrates this recognized concept of impermissible
vagueness and sets forth the analysis which the Court would likely employ
when interpreting a statute such as the Patriot Act. In City of Chicago,the
224. Id. § 29.
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., text accompanying supra note 170. While sections 412(a)(6) and (7) seem to
purport that the longest possible detention authorized under the Patriot Act is six months, upon a
careful examination of the language of the statute it becomes apparent that the Attorney General is
only required to review the certification every six months. The statute says nothing regarding the
length of time a certified noncitizen can ultimately be detained. Thus, while under section 412(a)(5)
detention is initially limited to seven days, once an individual is detained for removal proceedings
or criminal charges, the period for which the noncitizen could be detained is undefined to the extent
that the noncitizen is unable to be removed and continues to be certified by the Attorney General
based upon reasonable grounds that the noncitizen is a threat to national security. See Whitney D.
Frazier, The ConstitutionalityofDetainment in the Wake of September 11th, 90 KY. L.J. 1089,
1112-13 (2001-02).
227. See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 42, at 1934.
228. See id.
229. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
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Court held Chicago's gang loitering ordinance unconstitutional because it
defined the offense so vaguely as to provide "absolute discretion to police
officers to decide what activities constitute loitering."23 0 The Court
recognized that "preservation of liberty depends in part on the maintenance
of social order,""' but ruled that the law violated due process because it
failed to "provide the kind of notice that would enable people to
understand what conduct it prohibits." 2 2
Applying the analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court in City of Chicago, it
is possible that the expansion of the term "terroristactivity" to include the
use of "firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device" under the Patriot
Act may be impermissibly vague.23 For instance, this definition seems to
be applicable to any situation ranging from the use of a chemical bomb in
a busy New York City subway station to a barroom fight where one
individual threatens another with a broken beer bottle. Furthermore, the
statute's vague description of "terroristorganizations" leaves noncitizens
constantly pondering whether they are participating in or donating to
groups that engage in "terroristactivity," which would in turn lead to their
certification as a terrorist."' For example, a noncitizen's good faith
donation to a charitable association or a mere innocent association with a
particular organization may consequently result in their deportation. This
is because the Patriot Act includes as "terrorist organizations" any group
with "two or more individuals, whether organized or not," provided the
group engages in specified activities.23 s To more adequately protect the due
process rights of noncitizens, a more precise definition may be necessary
to define exactly what conduct will result in detention under the statute.2 36
Another possible due process concern is the indefinite detention of
noncitizens who have been granted relief from removal and of noncitizens
for whom repatriation is not reasonably foreseeable (provided their release
would "threaten the national security of the United States or the safety of
the community or any person").2 " In Zadvydas v. Davis,2 3 ' the U.S.
Supreme Court held that indefinite civil detention violates due process
unless it is ordered in "non-punitive circumstances" in which a "special
justification" exists. The Zadvydas Court did, however, recognize in
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 61.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 56.
See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 42, at 1935.
See id.
See id.
See id.
USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a) (2000) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C.
533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
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dictum that suspected terrorists could be held for indefinite periods in
preventative detention.2" The Court appeared to understand that removable
noncitizens detained for "terrorism or other special circumstances where
special arguments might be made for forms of preventative detention"
should not be affected by the general rule disapproving the indefinite
detention of noncitizens not likely to be removed in the reasonably
foreseeable future.2 4 0 Thus, as will be further discussed in Part V of this
Article, Zadvydas seemingly exempted suspected terrorists as a "small
segment of particularly dangerous individuals" that the government may
in fact subject to indefinite detention?'"
One could also attack the Patriot Act on procedural due process
grounds. 42 The statute does not require an objective showing that the
individual poses a danger to the community but relies instead on the
Attorney General's determination that he has "reasonable grounds" to
believe that a noncitizen is engaged in terrorist activity and therefore
subject to certification.2 43
In addition to the due process attacks which arguably could be made
against the Patriot Act's detention provisions, the Act has been criticized
on other grounds as well. First, it has been argued that the detention
provisions of the Patriot Act provide the certified terrorist with limited
options for relief. The statute prohibits administrative appeal of the
Attorney General's decision to certify a noncitizen as a terrorist. 2
Detainees are, therefore, left with one avenue for relief - the filing of a
habeas petition in federal court.24 ' This purported safeguard has been
criticized, however, on the grounds that the statue does not establish a
standard of review that will apply to the Attorney General's certification
and the decision to certify the alien in the first place may rest on secret

-

239. See id at 696.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 691.
242. The limitations imposed by the Due Process Clause are of two distinct types
procedural and substantive. Procedural due process commands that when the government acts to
deprive a person of life, liberty, or property, it must do so in accord with procedures that are
deemed fair. Procedural due process usually requires that a person be given notice and opportunity
to be heard before a depravation of rights occurs. Substantive due process insists that the law itself
be fair and reasonable and have an adequate justification regardless of how fair or elaborate the
procedures may be for implementing it. See generally ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, INDIVIDUALRIGHTS 2001 (discussing the provisions ofthe U.S. Constitution
that protect individuals against the government).
243. See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 42, at 1936.
244. Id. at 1937.
245. USA PATRIOT Act § 412(b) (2000) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a).
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evidence that cannot be reviewed by the detainee. 246 Nevertheless, this
avenue of relief is available, irrespective of the limits placed upon it, and
is substantially greater than the relief available to those noncitizens
detained in the United Kingdom under the ATCSA.
Finally, the Patriot Act may infringe on a noncitizen's freedom of
expression. By expanding the definition of the term "terrorist activity" to
include the donation to or solicitation of funds for a "terrorist
organization," the provisions allow for potentially indefinite detention of
noncitizens based solely on political associations which seemingly are
under the purview of the First Amendment. In Brandenburgv. Ohio,24 7 the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the "constitutional guarantees of free speech
and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action." 24 Furthermore, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,249 the
Court went even further and ruled that "mere advocacy of the use of force
or violence does not remove speech from the protection of the First
Amendment." "0 Nevertheless, the holdings of the Court in these two cases
are not likely to have an impact when attacking the constitutionality of the
detention provisions of the Patriot Act because the detention provisions of
the Patriot Act pertain to noncitizens. Although permanent resident
noncitizens do enjoy First Amendment rights, 25 ' under certain
circumstances, it is well-established that they may enjoy less constitutional
protection than citizens. 22 A strong argument can be made that any
association with a terrorist organization like al-Qaida is both directed at
inciting imminent lawless action and is very likely to incite or produce
exactly this type of action.

246. See Kent Scheidegger et al., The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001: Criminal Procedure
Sections 13 (Federalist Society White Paper, Nov. 2001); Anite Ramasastry, Indefinite Detention
Based upon Suspicion: How the Patriot Act Will Disrupt Many Lawful Immigrants' Lives,
Findlaw's Legal Comment (Oct. 5, 2001), available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
commentary/200 11005_ramasastry.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
247. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
248. Id. at 447.
249. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
250. Id. at 927.
251. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135,
148 (1945).
252. See Harvard Law Review Association, "Foreign"Campaign Contributionsandthe First
Amendment, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1886, 1895 (1997); see GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE
CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, ANDFUNDAMENTALLAw 3-15 (1996) (analyzing generally

the constitutional rights of noncitizens); Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the
Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1048-59 (1994).
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In sum, the implications of sections 411 and 412 of the Patriot Act for
noncitizens are certainly far-reaching, but as will be argued in infra Part
IV.B of this Article, not as sweeping as the detention provisions found
under the ATCSA. Noncitizens who engage in political activities in
connection with any organization risk being certified as terrorists and
subject to potentially indefinite detention whether on a technical
immigration violation or on terrorism grounds. 253 In addition, noncitizens
are unable to protect themselves from these risks by avoiding association
with organizations that have been designated as "terrorist organizations"
because the Act expands that term to include undesignated and undefined

grounds."5 4 Noncitizens cannot even protect themselves by limiting their

activity to seemingly innocent behavior such as soliciting membership for,
soliciting funds for, and providing material support to a newly designated
"terrorist organization" with only the goal of promoting the organization's
lawful ends because the Act broadens the term "engage in terrorist
activity" to include exactly these types of activities. 2 5" Therefore, in the
post-Patriot Act world, noncitizens who are intent on avoiding the risks of
being certified as a suspected terrorist and the possibility of indefinite
detention should refrain from any associations with organizations that
could potentially be deemed terrorist, even if they are partaking in
seemingly innocent activities.2 6 While the full effect of the detention
provisions of the Patriot Act have yet to be recognized, our commitment
to the Bill of Rights and to the democratic values that define the United
States have undoubtedly been put to the test by the events of September 11,
2001. Exactly how far the government can proceed in sacrificing civil
liberties in hopes of gaining an added measure of security will certainly be
tested in upcoming months throughout the federal court system. As will be
discussed in Part V of this Article, however, regardless of how the U.S.
Supreme Court ultimately rules and despite the Patriot Act's infringement
on the civil liberties of noncitizens, the detention provisions of the Patriot
Act, when compared with those of the U.K. ATCSA, reflect a reasoned

balance between liberty and security.

253. See Nancy Chang, The USA PA TRIOT Act: What's So PatrioticAbout Trampling on the
Bill ofRights?, available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/docsfUSA_PATRIOTACT.pdf(last
visited Jan. 3, 2004).
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See id.
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2. The ATCSA

"

Like the Patriot Act, the detention provisions of the ATCSA have been
extensively attacked as being both unlawful and disproportionate in light
of the state of affairs in the United Kingdom since September 11, 2001.
Before outlining the criticisms, however, it would be helpful to first
provide a brief introduction to the ECHR in order to better understand the
obligations that the United Kingdom is required to fulfill as a member.
Only then can one engage in a more comprehensive analysis of the
detention measures of the ATCSA.
Adopted in 1950, the ECHR obligates its member countries to "secure
the rights and freedoms" of the ECHR to everyone in their jurisdiction. 2
Broadly speaking, the ECHR provides international protection for a variety
of civil and political rights much like those contained in the U.S. Bill of
Rights. 2 ' The fundamental goal of the ECHR is to promote individuals'
rights and freedoms in an effort to best protect democracy. 2 9
The ECHR is comprised of various provisions. Of particular
importance to the focus of this Article is article 5, which addresses the
detention of noncitizens. It protects against unwarranted state intrusion
upon the liberty and security of individuals by prohibiting unjustified
detentions. 26 0 Although the member countries consider the rights and
freedoms detailed in the ECHR to be fundamental to democracy, however,
the ECHR nevertheless contains a public emergency exception. Article
15(1) of the ECHR provides that "in times of war or other public
emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party
may take measure derogating from its obligations under this Convention
to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation ... ." 2 61 n
reviewing a member country's declaration of a public emergency under
article 15, the European Court of Human Rights has consistently
maintained that it plays a limited role in the review of a member country's
derogation under article 15.262 The European Court instead grants member
countries a margin of appreciation recognizing that each member state is

257. See ECHR, supra note 13, art. 1.
258. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 11.
259. See Henning, supra note 6, at 1270.
260. See ECHR, supra note 13, art. 5.
261. Id. art. 15(1).
262. See, e.g., Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 539 (1994)
(affording a broad conception of the margin of appreciation doctrine in finding the derogation of
the United Kingdom under article 15 of the ECHR to be lawful); see Gross, supranote 97, at 49599 (explaining the margin of appreciation doctrine).
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primarily responsible for its own survival and stability. 263 Because
individual governments have continuous and direct contact with the
everyday conditions of the state and therefore are in the best position to
make such a determination, the European Court requires each member
country to determine the severity of the threat to the nation and allows the
country to determine the scope of the measures which are necessary to
monitor the situation. 26
In Lawless v. Ireland,2 5 the European Court of Human Rights
entertained a challenge by an Irish individual who at one time was a
member of the IRA and then, according to his own account, left that
organization fewer than five months later. 266 Nevertheless, he was detained
without trial for a period of almost six months. 26' The European Court held
that detaining Lawless violated his right to liberty article 5 of the ECHR. 26
Therefore, it is essential to examine if the detention could be justified
under the provisions of article 15.
In Lawless, the European Commission defined, and the European Court
of Human Rights agreed, that a public emergency for the purposes of
article 15 of the ECHR is a situation of exceptional and imminent danger
or crisis affecting the general public, as distinct from particular groups, and
constituting a threat to the organized life of the community which
comprises the State in question. 269 This definition was further developed
by the Commission, which in the 1969 case of Denmark Norway, Sweden
& the Netherlands v. Greece27 0(Greek case) held that in order to satisfy
article 15, a public emergency had to be "actual or imminent," its effects
had to "involve the whole nation," the continuance of the organized life of
the community must be threatened," and the crisis or danger must be
"exceptional," in that normal measures were "plainly inadequate." 2 7
Applying the rules of Lawless and the Greek case to the present state
of affairs, it is difficult to conclude that the current climate in the U.K.
amounts to the type of public emergency which threatens the life of the

263. See Henning, supra note 6, at 1274.
264. See id.
265. 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 15 (1979-80); see generallyBRIAN DOOLAN, LAWLESS V. IRELAND (19571961): THE FIRST CASE BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL
MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE? (2001) (analyzing in-depth the European Court's ruling in Lawless).
266. Lawless, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 17.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 37.
269. See id. at 30.
270. 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON H.R. 1 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
271. 1 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE GREEK CASE: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

(1969).
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nation. First, it is important to note that despite the supposed present
international "war on terrorism,"the United Kingdom is the only one of the
forty-one member states to have ratified the ECHR which has found it
necessary to derogate from the terms of the ECHR over this matter.27 2 It is
thus somewhat doubtful that the current state of affairs in the United

Kingdom could constitute a public emergency within the meaning of the

&

ECHR.27 3 The attacks on the United States have ended and there has yet to
be a direct attack on the United Kingdom. Therefore, while it may be
accurate to say there is a concern and that the United Kingdom should
remain alert, it is questionable if there is a public emergency in the United
Kingdom at this time.27 4
Furthermore, even if it was determined that a public emergency does
presently exist in the United Kingdom, it is even more difficult to conclude
that the detention measures contained in the ATCSA are absolutely
necessary. It appears that the measures implemented in relation to the
detention of noncitizens suspected of terrorism are not commensurate with
the current situation in the United Kingdom. 275 The current situation
appears distinguishable from Northern Ireland's position in Brannigan
McBride v. United Kingdom, where the European Court of Human Rights
held that the U.K. derogation from article 5 was in fact justified. 276
Whereas between 1972 and 1992 there were some three thousand deaths
and over forty thousand terrorist incidents attributed to terrorism in
Northern Ireland, there have been no terrorist incidents in the United
Kingdom directly associated with what happened in the United States on
September 11, 2001.27 In fact, in January 2002, shortly after the passing
of the ATCSA, the Home Secretary confirmed in Parliament that there was
"no immediate intelligence pointing to a specific threat to the United

Kingdom."278

272. See Tomkins, supra note 6, at 205-06.
273. Black-Branch, supra note 150, at 26.
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. See Tomkins, supra note 6, at 215.
277. See id. at 216. Despite the absence of terrorist attacks in connection with the attacks in
the United States on September 11, 2001 in the United Kingdom, the British government has
continually insisted that there is a high probability that international terroristswill launch an attack
against the United Kingdom. See, e.g., "High"Chance of UK Terror Attack, CNN.CoM (Dec. 18,
2002) (discussing a government briefing in London which warned of the possibility of future
terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom), available at http://www.cnn.com/
2002/WORLD/europe/12/18/terror.alert/index. html (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
278. Khan, supra note 6, at 11.
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In addition, even if the government was to prevail on the public
emergency argument, it would have to prove to the satisfaction of the
European Court of Human Rights that the continuing operational
effectiveness of the al-Qaida network poses an immediate and specific
threat to the United Kingdom which is serious enough that the nation
should regard itself as being in a state of emergency.2 79 Even if this
argument were to succeed, it is probable that the breadth of the coercive

powers contained in part 4 of the ATCSA would make it difficult to
establish that the detention measures contained in the Act are strictly
necessary. 280 The detention provisions are not limited only to those persons
who pose a terrorist threat to the United Kingdom as a result of the
September 11, 2001 attacks. Instead, the Act covers all noncitizens
suspected of terrorism, not just those responsible for the attacks in the
United States.2 8 ' Thus, the expansive nature of the detention measures
contained in part 4 of the ATCSA will make it difficult to show that the
provisions contained in the Act are strictly necessary to respond to the
attacks of September 11, 2001.
In short, the ATCSA is a momentous piece of legislation that conferred
great power - arguably too much power - on the state, especially in the
areas of deportation and detention without trial. Undoubtedly, the power
to indefinitely detain will adversely affect noncitizen nationals suspected
by the Secretary of State of involvement in terrorism but who cannot be
deported. Furthermore, it is probable that innocent people are likely to be
rounded up as well in the search for suspected noncitizen terrorists. 2 2
Whether these new laws are justified and proportionate in light of the
current situation in the United Kingdom, as well as how these laws should
be used, have been popular matters of debate and causes of concern since
the laws' passing.2 8 3 At this point, it is still too early to attempt to assess

279. See Tomkins, supra note 6, at 216.
280. See id.
281. See Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, § 21.
282. See Wadham, supra note 149, at 1074.
283. In July 2002 the SIAC found that the targeting of noncitizens of the United Kingdom
certified by the Secretary of State to be suspected terrorists under part 4 of the ATCSA was
discriminatory and that the detention measures were not compatible with the U.K. obligations under
the ECHR. See Amnesty International News Release, Detaining Non-UK NationalsIndefinitely is
Discriminatory(July 30, 2002), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2002/uk07302002.
html (last visited Nov. 7, 2002); BBC News, Terror Suspects Win Appeal, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk/2161710.stm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002). As of the writing of this
Article, the United Kingdom is appealing the judgment and the detainees under the detention
provisions of the ATCSA had yet to be released.
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the legal and political impact of the ATCSA as it remains to be seen what
kind of use will be made of the detention powers outlined in the above
discussion. While many of the ATCSA's provisions are seemingly
identical to those found under the Patriot Act, however, the detention
provisions under the Act are considerably more suspect than those of its
American counterpart. As this Article will argue in Part V, the way in
which the United Kingdom responded to the terroristattacks of September
11, 2001 poses an unjustifiable threat to the freedom and civil liberty of
non-British nationals in the United Kingdom and proceeds too far in the

name of national security.
V. THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND
SECURITY ACT 2001: REASONED RESPONSES OR OVERREACTIONS?

A. The USA PATRIOT Act
1. Will the U.S. Supreme Court Uphold a Challenge to the Patriot Act's
Detention Provisions?
Unquestionably, the U.S. government has a compelling interest in
responding to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Whether these
interests justify broad restrictions such as the indefinite detention of
noncitizens suspected of terrorism has yet to be determined. Surely
restrictions such as this raise serious constitutional concerns. Nevertheless,
as will be discussed below, the Court has consistently upheld the
executive's extraordinary powers to protect national security, and it is
unlikely that the current "war" on terror will be an exception. Thus, it is
not only possible but probable that the detention provisions of the Patriot
Act would pass constitutional muster. Furthermore, this Article will argue
that the Patriot Act's detention provisions, while possibly hostile to the
traditional civil liberties of noncitizens in the United States, are more
justifiable than the detention provisions enacted by the United Kingdom
under the ATCSA. In addition, not only are the detention measures under
the Patriot Act reasoned responses to the terroristattacks of September 11,
but they may be necessary responses in this uncertain time. While history
tells us that in our fight for freedom we may inevitably impinge upon
certain civil liberties, history also reassures us that these emergency
measures have had no lasting effect on American society once our battles
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have been won and peace has been restored.28 4 In fact, the Patriot Act, with
its explicit safeguards, may illustrate how previous infringements on civil
liberties have heightened our sensitivity to the importance of protecting
civil liberties. It must be recognized that if we lose our fight against
terrorism, the civil liberties of all people, citizens and noncitizens alike,
will no longer survive. Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that detention
theories are inherently flawed and thus, in the long-term, the detention
provisions under the Patriot Act, while possibly reasoned responses in the
name of liberty and security, may ultimately fail in their goal to eliminate
the terrorist threat to the United States.

It is not a matter of if, but instead a question of when, the power to
potentially indefinitely detain a noncitizen found under section 412 of the
Patriot Act will be challenged in the U.S. Supreme Court as a violation of
the noncitizen's Fifth Amendment due process rights. In predicting how
the Court would resolve the constitutionality of the Patriot Act's detention
provisions, it is important to remember the track record of the judiciary.
The judiciary has consistently deferred to the political branch of

government during times of crisis by finding the state interest in national
security to be paramount to competing interests. 28" For instance, during the
Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln established military courts to try
those sympathizing with the Confederacy and suspended habeas corpus. 2 6
Similarly, during World War I, the Court upheld the conviction of Eugene
Debs for expressing his anti-war sentiment. 28 7 Following the bombing of
Pearl Harbor during World War II, the Court upheld an executive order
which mandated the internment of both Japanese citizens and noncitizens
based solely on their ancestry. 28 8 While the current "war" on terrorism
differs in that the "war" on terrorism is not being waged against any
particular nation and because Congress has not declared war as required by
Article I of the U.S. Constitution, 2 9 the Court would likely draw an
analogy between these historical instances and the current state of affairs.

284. See Ting, supra note 143, at 1147 (for example, both Lincoln's suspension of habeas
corpus during the Civil War and Roosevelt's internment of Japanese-Americans during World War
II arguably had no permanent effect on American society once these battles were won and peace
restored). See generally G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFrER VICTORY: INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIC
RESTRAINT, AND THE REBULDING OF ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS (2001) (addressing what states

that have just won major wars do with their newly acquired power).
285. See CHANG, supra note 144, at 136.
286. See Mathews, supra note 1, at 465-67.
287. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
288. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1945).
289. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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Long ago the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a formal declaration of
war is not necessary for the executive to wage war.29 0 During the Civil
War, in determining what constituted a war, the Court held in The Prize
Cases 291 that "war has been well defined to be that state in which a nation
prosecutes its right by force." 292 In addition, the Court found that "war may
exist without a declaration on either side" and that "it is not necessary to
constitute war, that both parties should be acknowledged as independent

nations or sovereign States." 293 Just like there was no formal declaration of
war preceding the Civil War, in the current "war" on terrorism, Congress
has made the functional equivalent of a declaration of war in its
authorization of the use of force against al-Qaida.29 4 Therefore, as in The
Prize Cases, this type of authorization may be sufficient for the Court to
analogize the current state of affairs to instances where there were more
traditional declarations of war and for the Court to take judicial notice that
a state of war exists.29s
During World War II, the United States was once again faced with a
threat to national security when members of the German armed forces,
carrying explosives, fuses, and timing devices, secretly proceeded in a
submarine to the coast of the United States. 296 Similar to government's
considerations in passing the Patriot Act, the government of the day was

290. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862).
291. Id. at 635.
292. Id. at 666.
293. Id. at 668.
294. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18,
2001) (stating that the act is an authorization of military force made pursuant to the War Powers
Resolution).
295. Interestingly enough, the state of affairs following the Civil War provides further
historical support for the notion that civil liberties may be restricted even without a formal
declaration of war. The Reconstruction Act of 1867, passed in response to widespread Ku Klux
Klan violence in the South, showed a willingness on the part of Congress to restrict civil liberty in
times of national crisis, even though the nation was not at war. See Matt J. O'Laughlin, Exingent
Circumstances: Circumscribing the Exclusionary Rule in Response to 9/11,70 UMKC L. REV. 707,
714 (2002). Although the Civil War had ended two years earlier, Congress believed it was
necessary, in an effort to restore order, to institute military rule in the South. See id. After passing
the Reconstruction Acts, Congress then restricted the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme
Court to hear the issue, ensuring that it would not be held unconstitutional. See id. The
Reconstruction Acts laid out conditions for the readmission of states into the union, one of which
was the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. Essentially, Congress coerced the votes
of southerners through the use of military rule. Without this restraint on liberty, it is likely that
Fourteenth Amendment would not have been ratified. These circumstances suggest that the
Fourteenth Amendment, at least in part, came to fruition by placing restraints on civil liberty. See
id. at 715.
296. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1942).
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concerned that the current laws were not sufficient to protect the United
States from these types of individuals. President Roosevelt thus quickly
issued an order establishing a military commission 297 for the trial of the
saboteurs. 298 All eight German soldiers who landed in the United States

were tried before the military commission, with six eventually being
sentenced to death. 299
Following their convictions, the German soldiers filed a petition for
habeas corpus to challenge the constitutionality of their trial by military
commission.30 0 In Exparte Quirin,30 ' the U.S. Supreme Court convened in
a special term to hear arguments in the case of the petitioners. Not
surprisingly, the court dismissed the petitioners' arguments and upheld
their convictions reasoning that the President's wartime detention
decisions are to be accorded great deference from the courts. 30 2 The
opinion also established the presumption that presidential actions taken
pursuant to the commander in chief power during wartime are valid, unless
those actions are clearly in conflict with the Constitution. 303 Chief Justice
Stone wrote, "the detention and trial of petitioners - ordered by the
President in the declared exercise as Commander in Chief of the Army in
time of war and of grave public danger - are not to be set aside by the
courts without the clear conviction" that they are in violation of the U.S.
Constitution or laws of the United States. 304
While it is true that the situation in which President Roosevelt
authorized military commissions can be distinguished from the state of
affairs which precipitated the passing of the Patriot Act, a close reading of
Quirin supports the contention that the U.S. Supreme Court would likely
uphold the detention provisions of the Patriot Act. In contrast to the

297. Similar to the Military Order passed by President Roosevelt during World War II, on
November 13, 2001 President Bush also promulgated a military order authorizing the trial of
noncitizens suspected of complicity in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While an indepth discussion of President Bush's Military Order is beyond the scope of this Article, it has been
addressed extensively elsewhere. See, e.g., Christopher M. Evans, Terrorism on Trial: The
President'sConstitutionalAuthority to Order the ProsecutionofSuspected Terroristsby Military

Commission, 51 DUKE L.J. 1831 (2002); Daryl A. Mundis, The Use of Military Commissions to
Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 320 (2002); Diane F.
Orentlicher & Robert Kogod Goldman, When Justice Goes to War: ProsecutingTerroristBefore
Military Commissions, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 653 (2002).
298. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21-22.
299. Id. at 22-23; see also Evans, supra note 297, at 1842-43.
300. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 23-24; see also Evans, supra note 297, at 1842-43.
301. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
302. Id. at 25.
303. Id.
304. Id.
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invasion ofthe German soldiers and the circumstances which existed when
President Roosevelt promulgated his order, the United States was not in
the state of an armed conflict on the morning of September 11, 2001.
Unlike World War II, despite the president's proclaimed "war on
terrorism," the United States is not officially at war. Nevertheless, the

severity of the September 11 attacks, in both their purpose and effect,
undoubtedly commenced a state of "quasi-war" in the United States. The
decision of the Court in Quirin clearly illustrates that during times of
conflict and increased national security, civil liberties are not high
priorities for the judges. Furthermore, the Court's decision in Quirin
regarding the appropriateness of the use of military tribunals primarily
turned on the particular facts in the case, including the time in which the
events took place, the identity of the offenders, and the state of affairs of
the nation. This reasoning, when applied to the appropriateness of the
detention provisions of the Patriot Act, supports the detention of
noncitizens suspected of terrorism in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001.
In another famous World War II case, Korematsu v. United States,30 5
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the evacuation of people of Japanese
ancestry to relocation centers.306 Korematsu was convicted of remaining in
an area contrary to the order. 30 7 In a short ten-page opinion, the Court
affirmed his conviction and held that the evacuation of people of Japanese
ancestry was necessary because ofthe presence of an unascertained number
of disloyal members of the group. 308 In affirming his conviction, Justice
Frankfurter noted that "the validity of action under the war power must be
judged wholly in the context of war. That action is not to be stigmatized as
lawless because like action in times of peace would be lawless." 309 The
decision of the Court in Korematsu confirms the fact that judges are wary
of striking down wartime measures when the national security of the
United States is threatened. Thus, there is little reason to believe that the
Court would depart from this line of decisions when interpreting the
detention provisions of the Patriot Act.
Finally, and most significantly for determining the fate of the Patriot
Act's detention provisions, there is the decision ofthe U.S. Supreme Court
in Zadvydas, which came down less than three months before the terrorist

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Id. at 218.
Id. at 215-216.
Id. at 218, 224.
Id. at 224.
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attacks of September 11, 2001.310 Zadvydas v. Davis combined two cases
that had led to opposite results in the courts of appeal. Both cases involved
noncitizens who had enjoyed the status of lawful permanent resident after
arriving in the United States as children.3"' Kestutis Zadvydas was a
noncitizen resident of the United States who was born to Lithuanian
parents in a German displaced persons camp.3 12 After a drug conviction, he
served two years in prison and was detained thereafter by the INS which
ordered his removal. 313 Because both Germany and Lithuania refused to
accept Zadvydas as their own citizen, the INS held him beyond the ninetyday removal period allowed by the statute.3 14 The Fifth Circuit upheld the
statute reasoning that although Zadvydas's status as a permanent resident
afforded him greater procedural due process rights, this status did not
afford him greater substantive rights under the Due Process Clause.3 15 In
essence, the circuit court refused, at least for detention purposes, to
recognize a meaningful distinction between deportable noncitizens subject
to final orders of removal and excludable noncitizens. 16 Moreover, the
Fifth Circuit found that Zadvydas's continued detention did not constitute
"permanent confinement" because his removal was not an absolute
impossibility and because he could be released upon a determination that
he no longer represented a flight risk or danger to the community.m'
Therefore, because Zadvydas failed to sustain his burden by proving that
he was not dangerous and releasable, and as long that the INS provided a
procedure for periodic review of releasability coupled with good faith
efforts to effectuate deportation, ongoing detention did not violate the U.S.

Constitution.'
'

Similar to Zadvydas, Kim Ho Ma came to the United States from
Cambodia and had been a resident noncitizen since the age of seven. 3
After being convicted of manslaughter, he spent a little over two years in
prison where upon release he was placed into the custody of the INS to

310. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
311. Id. at 682-86.
312. Id. at 684.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 685; see also Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 42,
at 1922 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's decision in Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir.
1999)).
316. See Martin, supra note 42, at 69.
317. See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 42, at 1922.
318. See Martin, supra note 42, at 69.
319. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 685.
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begin removal proceedings. 2 0 The INS detained Ma beyond the ninety-day
period because Cambodia would not accept him.3 2' In contrast to the
decision of the Fifth Circuit in Zadvydas, however, the Ninth Circuit
refused to uphold the statute.32 2 Instead, the circuit court construed the INA
to prohibit detention for more than a "reasonable time" beyond the ninetyday removal period.3 2 3 The circuit court found that where, as in Ma's case,
no reasonable likelihood of removal exists, the statute did not authorize
detention beyond ninety days.32 4
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases to resolve the
split, consolidated them, vacated, and remanded.3 25 The majority held that

any law allowing the indefinite detention of deportable noncitizens would
raise substantial constitutional concerns. 326 To survive a constitutional
challenge, the Court reasoned that indefinite civil detention must occur in
"non-punitive circumstances" where a "special justification" exists.3 2 7
Even assuming that the objectives for detaining individuals such as
Zadvydas and Ma were non-punitive, the Court found no compelling
special justification for their indefinite confinement once the likelihood of
their repatriation became remote.3 28 In addition, the majority was not
persuaded by the government's justifications for detention. The
government's first justification for detention - preventing flight from

removal proceedings - did not constitute ajustification for continued INS
detention. 329 Similarly, while the Court acknowledged that the
government's secondjustification-protecting the community from harm
- was valid, the Court stressed that preventative detention based on
dangerousness would be permitted only when it is imposed on highly
dangerous individuals and only if there are "strong procedural protections"
in place.3 3 The majority was skeptical of the INA's post-order detention
provision because it applied to a broad range of noncitizens rather than a

320. Id.
321. Id. at 686.
322. Id.; see also Martin, supra note 42, at 69-70.
323. See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 42, at 1923.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
328. See id.; see also Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 42, at 1923.
329. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691; see also Harvard Law Review Association, supra note
42, at 1923.
330. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691; see also Harvard Law Review Association, supra note
42, at 1923-24.
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narrow segment of the population, and because it offered minimal
procedural protections."'
Nevertheless, in order to avoid finding the post-order provision
unconstitutional, the U.S. Supreme Court construed the statute to permit
incarceration beyond the ninety-day period only as long as removal
remained "reasonably foreseeable."3 3 2 In doing so, the majority established
a presumption that detention of a deportable noncitizen is reasonable for
six months following a final order of removal." After that time, the
detained noncitizen may petition the government for release by showing
"good reason" to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal
in the reasonably foreseeable future." 4 The government must rebut such a
showing to continue holding the noncitizen in custody." 5
Despite the Court's expression of serious doubt about the
constitutionality of the INA's post-order detention mandate, the majority
did recognize, in language that now appears prescient, that the cases before
it did not require it "to consider terrorism or other special circumstances
where special arguments might be made for forms of preventative
detention and for heightened deference to the judgments of the political
branch with respect to matters of national security."33 6 In doing so, the
Court essentially carved out a potential exception for certain noncitizen
terrorists and recognized that terrorism creates a type of public fear that
may not be present with other national threats of security. The
acknowledgment by the majority of the genuine danger represented by
terrorism or other exceptional circumstances seems to eerily foreshadow
the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent struggles now facing
our nation. While lessons from the past may counsel against such a rule
that affords heightened judicial deference to the political branch in cases
that implicate national security, this loophole created by the majority
undoubtedly gives the political branch room to maneuver and for the Court
to utilize detention in the current war on terrorism. The Zadvydas decision,
therefore, would not require the release of noncitizens held on allegations
of terrorism who have no prospect of being able to return to their home
country. What the Patriot Act appears to do is effectively codify this

331.
1923-24.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691-92; Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 42, at
See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 696.
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exception requiring the continued detention of removable noncitizens
suspected of terrorism. 337
The Patriot Act's provisions on indefinite detention for certified
noncitizens suspected of terrorism are likely to be ruled constitutional
given both the current heightened popular awareness of the national
security threat posed by noncitizens living in the United States who have
the intent to perpetrate terrorist attacks against Americans, and because the
detention provisions of the Act exceed the Zadvydas standard regarding
suspected terrorists held on an indefinite basis. First, section 412(b)
specifically providesjudicial review of suspected noncitizen terrorists held
on an indefinite basis.338 Second, the new law proscribes fixed time limits
for review of the Attorney General's initial certification. Section 412(a)(6)
provides that an alien whose "removal is unlikely in the reasonably
foreseeable future may be detained for additional periods of up to six
months if release threatens national security or the safety of an individual
or community." 339 In addition, section 412(a)(7) requires the Attorney
General to review the certification every six months and allows the
suspected noncitizen terrorist to request a reconsideration of the
certification every six months. 340 It is only when all these provisions are
satisfied that the terrorist suspect may be subject to potential indefinite
detention. Therefore, if the Court stands by its decision in Zadvydas and
follows precedent of this decision and other decisions passed down in
times of crisis, it is unlikely that the detention provisions of the Patriot Act
will be struck down as an unconstitutional infringement on the rights of
noncitizens. 34

337. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272,
§ 412 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a).
338. See id. § 412(b) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a).
339. See id. § 412(a)(6) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a).
340. See id. § 412(a)(7) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a).
341. Finally, the most telling indication of how the U.S. Supreme Court will rule on the
detention provisions of the Patriot Act may be found in the words spoken by Supreme Court Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor. Upon her visit to the World Trade Center site in New York shortly after the
terrorist attacks O'Connor commented that, "we are likely to experience more restrictions on
personal freedom than has even been the case in this country." Linda Greenhouse, A Nation
Challenged: The Supreme Court; In New York Visit, O'ConnorForeseesLimits on Freedom, N.Y.

TIMEs, Sept. 29, 2001, at B5. This statement by O'Connor is also extremely important because she
is often considered the swing vote on the current Court. Her views are therefore crucial. In addition
to this comment, her concurring opinion in the Foucha case may indicate that she is more open to
some kinds of indefinite detention than the other members of the Court who made up the Zadvydas
majority. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining PlenaryPower: The Meaningand Impact of
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2. Are the Detention Provisions of the Patriot Act Justifiable?
Extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures. During this uncertain
time, it is impossible for the United States to predict the future with any
type of certainty. History has warned us that in a struggle against evil, the
traditional civil liberties of some individuals may have to be curtailed.
Nevertheless, history also assures us that once the emergency is over, the
provisions which adversely compromised traditional civil liberties will be
eliminated and peace can be restored.34 2
The detention provisions of the Patriot Act, while certainly hostile to the

traditional civil liberties of noncitizens, can be defended as a reasoned and
justifiable response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While
the provisions do subject more individuals than ever to deportation on
terrorism grounds due to the newly expanded definitions of the terms
"terrorist activity" and "terrorist organization," safeguards have been built
into the Patriot Act in an effort to adequately protect noncitizens from the
possibility of arbitrary indefinite detention. Some of these protections
include a limitation on the Attorney General's power to delegate his
certification power to the Deputy Attorney General alone, 343 a requirement
to initiate removal proceedings or bring criminal charges within seven days
of the commencement of detention, 3" a limitation on the detention of
noncitizens who cannot be removed and those noncitizens who are waiting
to be removed if it is determined that the release of these noncitizens
would threaten national security or public safety,3 45 mandatory review of
certification by the Attorney General every six months, 346 and a provision
for judicial review through the filing of a habeas petition and appeals.3 47
Finally, and quite possibly most significantly, in contrast to the situation
in the United Kingdom, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were
perpetrated on American soil. After the attacks, it was discovered that the
State Department had issued visas to all nineteen hijackers responsible for
the terrorist attacks. 348 These lapses in immigration law enforcement

Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 384 (2002) (discussing the future of the Zadvydas
decision).
342. See Ting, supra note 143, at 1147.
343. See USA PATRIOT Act § 412 (2000) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a).
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 42, at 1931.
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brought to light how our relatively open borders and open society make us
an easy target for terrorist activity. Consequently, the federal government
was forced to take action fast. While the detention of noncitizens as
authorized under the Patriot Act may not be the best solution or the most
effective approach to combat terrorism, it represents a reasoned response
to a difficult situation. After all, if the United States does not fight
terrorism, civil liberties as a whole will not survive as there will be no one
left to fight for freedom and democracy.3 49 The civil liberty that the U.S.
government should focus on at this crucial time is that of all people, both
American and non-American, to live their lives free from the threat of
terrorism." This is a priority that surely factored into the U.S.
government's reasoning when it enacted the detention provisions of the
Patriot Act. Nevertheless, while the continuing threat posed by terrorism
may justify the detention provisions, the United States must remain
mindful that if and when the situation stabilizes, the detention measures
should be reviewed to ensure that the civil liberties of noncitizens are not
unnecessarily being truncated.35 ' In addition, given the continuing threat of
terrorist attacks, it is essential for the United States to abide by the explicit
safeguards which have been outlined in the Patriot Act to protect against
the possibility of potential arbitrary indefinite detention.3 2

349. See Ting, supra note 143, at 1147.
350. See id.
351. This Article is not arguing that the threat of terrorism will be eradicated anytime soon or
even that it will ever be completely eliminated. The development of international terrorism has
placed the world under a real and most likely permanent threat. In fact, this view is supported by
President Bush himself who believes it will be well beyond our lifetimes before the war on
terrorism comes to an end. See Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 571-73 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(summarizing the government's June 11, 2002 arguments in reply to Padilla's then-pending motion
to vacate the material witness statute). Instead, what this Article is arguing is that the new and
expanded detention powers under the Patriot Act should be both limited in time and confined to
periods of emergency and uncertainty.
352. Most notably, the U.S. government must ensure that noncitizens certified as terrorists
have access to the judicial review procedures explicitly outlined in the Patriot Act which enable
certified terrorists to file a habeas petition to protest their certification and detention. See USA
PATRIOT Act § 412 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a). In addition, it is important that the
Attorney General review the certification of each noncitizen every six months without exception.
See id. Finally, it is mandatory that the Attorney General submit reports to the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate every
six months regarding: (1) the number of noncitizens detained under these provisions; (2) the
grounds for the certifications; (3) the nationalities of those noncitizens certified; (4) the length of
the detention of each certified noncitizen; and (5) the number ofnoncitizens certified who (A) were
granted relief from removal; (B) were removed; (C) are no longer noncitizens who should be
certified; or (D) were released. Id.
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B. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001

1. Will the European Court of Human Rights Uphold the U.K.
Derogation from the ECHR Under the ATCSA?
In contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court's potential reasoning in
upholding the Patriot Act, it is questionable whether the European Court
of Human Rights would rule that the detention provisions of the ATCSA
are valid. Irrespective of a specific terrorist threat or independent terrorist
attack against the United Kingdom, because of the nation's relationship to
the United States, it cannot be ignored that the nation is a target for
terrorist activity. While true that traditionally the United Kingdom has been
afforded great deference when addressing terrorist threats and while there
are purported safeguards contained within the ATCSA to ensure that the
detention provisions of the Act are reviewed and remain temporary, the
European Court will most likely find that the detention provisions of the
ATCSA have proceeded too far in the name of national security and rule
that the United Kingdom has not made a valid derogation from the ECHR
under article 15. Given the current state of affairs in the United Kingdom,
not only are the detention measures of the ATCSA unnecessary and
disproportionate, but they also fail to provide adequate procedural
safeguards to protect noncitizens from arbitrary detention.
While from the beginning, both the European Court of Human Rights
and European Commission have indicated that they will not abdicate
jurisdiction over article 15 questions, both have assumed an extremely
deferential attitude towards governmental assertions of conformity with
requirements of article 15.33 Governments historically fare well when their
decisions concerning the existence of a particular situation of emergency
are reviewed by the European Court. Nevertheless, in regards to the recent
U.K. derogation, there is reason to believe that the European Court would
rule differently.5 4

353. Gross, supra note 97, at 492.
354. See id. at 493. The traditional deference shown to member countries is the result of such
factors as tremendous delays in bringing cases before the European Commission and the European
Court of Human Rights, the lack of a fact-finding mechanism, and the restriction to initiate an
investigation into a specific situation in a state party. Instead, procedural rules require the European
Commission and the European Court to await a formal application by another state party to the
ECHR or by an individual. Id. However, the doctrine of the "margin of appreciation" is the main
mechanism by which this deferential attitude is implemented. This doctrine and the jurisprudence
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Several significant cases have come before the European Court of Human
Rights and the European Commission on Human Rights". that have
judged the efforts of the United Kingdom to control terrorism in Northern
Ireland within the constraints of the ECHR. 356 For the purposes of this
Article, only those cases which addressed the detention provisions of the
U.K. terrorist legislation after the passing of the PTA of 1974 and the EPA
of 1973 will be addressed here. 3 7

developed around it have resulted in bringing a significant element of subjectivity into the
identification of public emergencies, and as a result have undermined the ability of the European
Commission and European Court to formulate rules based on strict requirements, opting instead for
vague standards that increase the leeway for discretion and flexibility. Id. at 495.
The margin of appreciation doctrine essentially means that when reviewing whether a public
emergency exists in a particular case or whether certain governmental emergency measures were
in fact "strictly necessary," the European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights
will generally not interfere with the state's judgment on the matter if it falls within a certain margin
of appreciation. Id. at 496. If, in derogating, a state's appreciation is at least on the margin of its
powers under article 15, the European Commission and European Court usually rules in its favor.
Gross, supra note 97, at 496. The rationale is that in such cases the public's interest in an effective
government and in the maintenance of order should prevail and that the national government is in
the best position to balance the conflicting considerations of the public interest and complex factors
involved in preserving law and order in the face of public emergency. Id. This is because the
national government is presumed to be more familiar than the European Commission or the
European Court with the particular circumstances which face the nation. Id. at 497. In fact,
invalidating a state's judgment on a matter is only possible when the judgment is entirely outside
the margin. Id. Thus, as it is nearly impossible to obtain a decision against the national government
in situations alleged to amount to "public emergencies threatening the life of a nation," there is little
reason to believe that the previous practices of the European Commission and European Court in
avoiding an independent review of the evidence and the tendency to succumb to the position of the
national government will be abandoned in addressing the detention provisions under the ATCSA.
See id.

355. Both the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission on Human
Rights were established under article 19 of the ECHR. See ECHR, supra note 13, art. 19. The
Commission may start an investigation into a complaint alleging that a state party has violated the
ECHR upon an interstate complaint (i.e., a complaint filed by another member state) under article
24 of the ECHR or upon an application of an individual. See id. arts. 4-25. If an application is
found to be admissible by the Commission, the Commission first attempts to achieve a friendly
settlement between the parties. See id. art. 30. In the case where no settlement can be reached, the
Commission then has the ability to refer the case to the European Court. See generally JAIS ET AL.,
supra note 206 (providing a broad overview of how the European system operates).
356. See generally JACKSON, supra note 5 (studying the conflicts which have arisen between
the United Kingdom, the European Court and the ECHR).
357. In 1971, prior to the enactment of either the EPA or the PTA, in the case of Ireland v.
United Kingdom, the Irish government contended that measures such as the detention and
internment without trial as well as certain interrogation techniques introduced under the Civil
Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) in 1922 violated articles 3, 5, and 6 of the
ECHR. The Commission concluded that although the powers of detention and internment did
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Article 5.3 of the ECHR provides that everyone lawfully arrested or
detained "shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer
authorized by law to exercise judicial power, and shall be entitled to trial
within a reasonable time or to release pending trial."3 18 The issue in Brogan
and Others v. United Kingdom311 involved four individuals who were
arrested under section 12 of the PTA as amended in 1984.360 These

individuals were detained between four and six days under the PTA on
suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities in Northern Ireland. 36 1This
section of the PTA proscribed the IRA and in section 12(1) provided that

a law enforcement agent could arrest without warning any person whom
he had reasonable grounds for suspecting to be a terrorist. 362 Section 12(4)
provided for forty-eight hours initial detention and § 12(5) provided that
detention could be extended by five additional days.363 None of the four
was brought before a judge and none was charged after subsequent
release. 3" Brogan and the other three detainees argued that their detention
violated article 5.3 of the ECHR because they were not taken before a
magistrate.
The European Court of Human Rights concluded that the extrajudicial
powers of arrest and detention contained in the PTA were incompatible
with the U.K. obligations under the ECHR. 36 Being that none of the four
suspects was brought immediately before ajudge, the European Court had
a fairly easy time of finding a breach of article 5.3. The European Court
violate the provisions of article 5 of the ECHR, this detention without trial could be justified under
article 15 as being strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. In addition, the Commission
concluded that the use of certain interrogation techniques such as deprivation of food and standing
against a wall amounted to torture under article 3 of the ECHR. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2
Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1979-80). This decision focused primarily on the interrogation techniques and
procedures used by Britain rather than on the powers of detention. What is significant, however,
is that the decision in Irelandboth affirmatively recognized that an emergency did in fact exist in
the United Kingdom, even though there was a continuous crisis and not a temporary public
emergency. Additionally, it is important to recognize the expansion of the margin of appreciation
doctrine by the Commission in this case. Both of these factors may have direct implications on how
the European Court of Human Rights would rule on the detention provisions of the ATCSA. See
Gross, supra note 97, at 469-73.
358. See ECHR, supra note 13, art. 5.
359. 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 117 (1989).
360. See id. at 120-22.
361. See id.
362. See id at 122; see also JACKSON, supra note 5, at 48-9.
363. See Brogan,

11

364. See Brogan,

11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 122; see also Gross, supra note 97, at 477.

Eur. Ct. H.R. at 123-24; see also JACKSON, supra note 5, at 49.

365. See Patricia M. Roche, The UnitedKingdom's Obligationto Balance HumanRights and

its Anti-Terrorism Legislation: The Case ofBrogan and Others, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 328, 346
(1989-90).
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ruled that even the shortest period for which one of the four individuals
had been held, four days and six hours, violated the ECHR.366
The British government, obviously dejected with the European Court's
ruling, insisted that it needed to retain the seven day detention period found
under the PTA. 367 In response, Britain announced that it would derogate
from its ECHR obligations under article 15:
There have been in the United Kingdom in recent years campaigns
of organized terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern
Ireland which have manifested themselves in activities which have
included repeated murder, attempted murder, maiming, intimidation
and violent civil disturbance and in bombing and fire raising which
have resulted in death, injury and widespread destruction of
property. As a result, a public emergency within the meaning of
Article 15(1) of the Convention exists in the United Kingdom. 36
Adhering to the European Court's reasoning in Brogan, it seems likely
that the detention provisions of the ATCSA would be found to violate the
ECHR. In Brogan, the European Court held that the fact that a detained
person is not charged or brought before a court does not in itself amount
to a violation of the ECHR. 369 In addition, the European Court believed
that a violation of the ECHR could not arise if the arrested person was
released promptly before any judicial review of his detention would have
been feasible.37 0 If the detained person was not released promptly,
however, the European Court held that he would be entitled to an
appearance before a judge or judicial officer.3 7 ' In assessing and
interpreting the notion of "promptness," the European Court recognized the
special problems associated with the investigation of terrorist offenses.37 2
Nevertheless, the European Court did not believe that the terrorist threat
which faced the United Kingdom justified the disposal of prompt judicial
control. 37 Thus, the European Court adhered to a narrow interpretation of
the meaning of the word "promptness" in order to ensure that the rights of

366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.

See Brogan, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 135-36; see also Gross, supra note 97, at 477.
See DONAHUE, supra note 5, at 260.
See id.
Brogan, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 133.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 135.
Id.
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detained individuals were protected.3 7 4 Under this interpretation, even the
four days and six hours spent in police custody by one of the detainees was
outside the strict constraints of the time permitted by the ECHR.3 7
Applying the considerations of the European Court of Human Rights
in Brogan to the ATCSA, it is unlikely that a court would uphold the
detention provisions of part 4. The ATCSA contains no explicit provision
which requires the Secretary of State to commence proceedings within a
certain period of time. A noncitizen could, therefore, be held for an
indefinite period of time without being charged with any type of
immigration violation or criminal activity. Thus, the European Court
would likely conclude that individuals held pursuant to the detention
provisions of the ATCSA are not brought promptly before a judicial
authority or released promptly following their arrest. Identical to the
European Court's reasoning in Brogan, "the undoubted fact that the arrest
and detention of the applicant were inspired by the legitimate aim of
protecting the community as a whole from terrorism is not on its own
sufficient to ensure compliance with the specific requirements of Article
5(3)."376

In addition, as noted by the European Court of Human Rights in
Brogan, the remedy of habeas corpus was available to the applicants in that
case.37 7 Thus, even though they did not avail themselves of such
proceedings, the detained individuals in Brogan did have an opportunity

to have the lawfulness of their arrest and detention reviewed by a
competent court.378 Under the ATCSA, however, those detained under part
4 are not afforded the safeguards of habeas corpus. Instead, the ATCSA
precludes regularjudicial review ofthe Secretary of State's decisions under
sections 21 and 23 and allows these decisions only to be questioned in
legal proceedings before the SIAC. 379 Thus, unlike the detained individuals
in Brogan, those arrested and detained under the ATCSA have no right to
bring proceedings in order to have a court quickly determine the lawfulness
of their detention.
The validity of the British government's derogation from the ECHR
was subsequently challenged in Brannigan & McBride v. United

374. Brogan, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 134-35.
375. Id. at 136.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. See Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001,
(for a more in-depth discussion of the SIAC).
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Kingdom,380 once again by detainees who were contesting the length of
their detention. After being arrested in 1989, Brannigan was held
altogether for more than six days while McBride was held for more than
four days before both men were released without charge. 38 ' The facts of
this case were substantially similar to those of Brogan. This time, however,
the British government conceded that article 5(3)'s promptness
requirement was not met but invoked as a defense the derogation notice it
submitted following the European Court's decision in Brogan, claiming
that the article 5(3) violation was justified under article 15.382
The detainees argued that given the "quasi-permanent" nature of the
state of emergency in Northern Ireland, the margin of appreciation
accorded the United Kingdom should be narrowed, 383 especially given the
European Court's ruling in Brogan that judicial review was one of the
fundamental requirements of a democratic society.3 84 Despite this
argument, the majority of the European Court adopted a broad conception
of the margin of appreciation and found in the U.K.'s favor. According to
the preconditions for derogation that` (1) there existed a "war or other
public emergency threatening the life ofthe nation," (2) the derogation was
"strictly required by the exigencies of the situation," and (3) the measures
were not inconsistent with the state's other international obligations, the
European Court determined that the derogation was valid. 38 6 It decided that
as far as the "strictly required" question was concerned, the government
had not overstepped its margin of appreciation in its decision to exclude

380. 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 539 (1994).
381. See Gross, supra note 97, at 480. McBride was killed before the European Court of
Human Rights could rule on his case. He was one of three people killed at a Sinn Fein Center by
an RUC officer, who killed himself as well a few hours after the murders. See JACKSON, supra note
5, at 54.
382. See Brannigan, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 551-52.
383. The European Court of Human Rights has consistently held that a court plays a limited
role in review of a member country's declaration of a public emergency under article 15. The
European Court generally grants member countries this margin of appreciation because it
recognizes that each member state is primarily responsible for its own survival and stability. That
is not to say, however, that member nations enjoy absolute deference from the European Court
regarding the scope of derogation from their obligations under the ECHR. See PartVI (discussing
in-depth the margin of appreciation and how it operates), see also Gross, supra note 97, at 495-99;
see generally Nicholas Lavender, The Problem of the Margin ofAppreciation, 4 EUR. HUM. RTS.
L. REv. 380 (1997) (arguing that the European Court's use of the margin of appreciation doctrine
when interpreting the ECHR needs to be more consistent).
384. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 54.
385. The preconditions for a valid derogation under article 15 of the ECHR were explored in
more detail in Parts IV.B.3 and IV.B.1 of this Article.
386. See DONAHUE, supra note 5, at 260.
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judicial control as part of the process of extending detention.3 8 7 The
European Court concluded that adequate and effective safeguards existed
against potential abuse of the arrest and detention powers given to the
government's agents. 388
While there are similarities between the circumstances in Brannigan
and the current state of affairs in the United Kingdom, there are also
differences which distinguish the detention provisions under the ATCSA
and, thus, make it likely that the European Court of Human Rights, even
despite their ruling in Brannigan, would strike down the detention
measures of the ATCSA. In finding that the United Kingdom had not
exceeded their margin of appreciation, the European Court strongly
emphasized the various effective safeguards which were imbedded in the
legislation at issue in Brannigan.389 The European Court felt that these
safeguards provided an important measure of protection against arbitrary
detention. 390 In contrast, the safeguards that the European Court relied on
in upholding the U.K. derogation in Branniganare glaringly absent from

the ATCSA.
First, the remedy of habeas corpus available in Brannigan,which was
readily available to test the lawfulness of the original arrest and detention,
does not exist under the ATCSA. 39' Second, unlike those detained in
Brannigan,individuals detained under the ATCSA do not have an absolute
and legally enforceable right to consult a solicitor after forty-eight hours
from the time ofarrest. 3 92 Instead, because of the unconventional procedure
before the SIAC, an individual's legal representatives will be chosen for
him by the Attorney General (or other appropriate law officer) and will not
be responsible to the individual. 393 Third, the European Court in Brannigan
recognized that the legislation at issue had been kept under regular
independent review and that it was subject to regular renewal. 394 While the
ATCSA does contain a review provision and requires that there be a
review of the detention provisions by a person appointed by the Secretary
of State within fourteen months of the ATCSA's coming into force, 395 as
well as provide for the expiration of the detention provisions fifteen

387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.

See Gross, supra note 97, at 481.
See id.
Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 539, 575 (1994).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 575-76.
See Tomkins, supra note 6, at 217-18.
Brannigan, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 576.
See Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, § 28.
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months after the ATCSA's enactment, 396 the effectiveness of these
provisions has yet to be seen. In addition, the review provisions of the
ATCSA are distinguishable from the legislation at issue in Brannigan,as
the detention provisions under the ATCSA are not subject to independent
review. Instead, it is the Secretary of State, the same individual who
determines who will and will not be certified as a terrorist under the
ATCSA, who appoints a person to review the legislation.3 97 Furthermore,
while section 29 does provide that the detention provisions will expire after
fifteen months, the Secretary of State (by order subject to approval by both
Houses), can revive the detention provisions. 39
Finally, the European Court of Human Rights in Branniganrecognized
the limited scope of the derogation and how it was designed to address the
specific terrorist threat posed by Northern Ireland. 399 In Brannigan, the
derogation was in response to organized terrorism directly connected to the
affairs of the British Government. This terrorism was occurring on a
regular basis over a period of time and was directly affecting British
citizens.40 0 Conversely, unlike the state of affairs in the United Kingdom
at the time Branniganwas decided, where the derogation was a reasoned
response to a situation rooted in the everyday lives of British citizens,4 0 ' the
derogation order under the ATCSA does not seem justified from the view
of the general British public. Unlike the legislation in question in
Brannigan,the detention provisions of the ATCSA have little to do with
the recent developments in international security and are not carefully
targeted at the exceptional situation with which they were designed to deal.
In addition, the dissents suggested that some of the judges on the
European Court ofHuman Rights were growing tired of the persistent state
of emergency and consequent derogations in Northern Ireland. For
example, Judge Pettiti of France refused to concede that the independence
ofjudges might be undermined by participating in the decision whether or
not to extend a period of detention. 402 Similarly, the dissenting opinions of
Judges DeMeyer and Makarczyk and the concurring opinions of Judges
Russo and Martens together suggest that the duration of the derogations by
the United Kingdom and the expansive broadening of the margin of

396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

Id. § 29.
Id. § 28.
Id. § 29.
Brannigan, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 576.
See Black-Branch, supra note 150, at 29.
See id.

402. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 55.
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appreciation granted the United Kingdom were becoming problematic.4 03
These opinions, while not those of the great majority of the European
Court, nevertheless may prove important when it might rule on the
detention provisions enacted by the ATCSA.
Lending some support to the conclusion that the European Commission
and the European Court of Human Rights might possibly uphold the
detention provisions contained in the ATCSA are the measures in place to
ensure that the United Kingdom continually reviews the necessity of the
emergency powers and that the derogation from its obligations under the
ECHR last only as long as the emergency lasts. The ATCSA requires
review of the sections concerning the detention of suspected noncitizen
terrorists and provides rules that the government must abide by in the
review process.404 These rules include specifying the number of people
who must review the sections, the timing of the review, and the
presentation of a report on the review to both the Secretary of State and
Parliament. 40 5 Furthermore, the purported temporary nature of the detention

measures will similarly be an important factor in determining whether the
European Commission and the European Court will support the Act's
detention provisions. The Act limits the Secretary of State's power to
certify and detain suspected noncitizen terrorists by explicitly stating that
the detention provisions found under sections 21-23 will expire as of
November 10, 2006.406 Because these measures may help to ensure that the
British government will not abuse its powers and that the measures taken
in response to a public emergency are narrowly tailored to the
circumstances required by that emergency, it is possible, although not
likely, that the European Commission and the European Court would
uphold the validity of the detention provisions.
Overall, however, the lack of procedural safeguards and the highly
suspect and disproportional nature of the detention measures contained in
the ATCSA makes it unlikely that the European Court of Human Rights
would uphold the detention provisions. While the European Court has been
fairly deferential to British claims of exigency in the past and has often
afforded the British a wide margin of appreciation when the nation has
been faced with similar difficult situations in dealing with the threat posed
by suspected noncitizen terrorists, the current situation is distinguishable

403. See id.
404. See Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001,
405. See id §§ 28, 122.
406. See id § 29.
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from the previous terrorist threats the United Kingdom has confronted. 407
While the traditional deference consistently afforded to the United
Kingdom, combined with the fact that the ATCSA contains a clause that
purportedly makes the detention of suspected noncitizen terrorists a
temporary measure cannot be ignored, it is improbable that the European
Court would uphold the detention provisions as a valid and proportional
response to the threat of terrorism that exists in the United Kingdom. 408
2. Can the Detention Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and

Security Act 2001 be Justified?
One of the key questions regarding the passing of the ATCSA and the
validity of the detention provisions has been whether the United Kingdom
has correctly concluded that it faces a public emergency within the
meaning of article 15 of the ECHR and has taken only those steps required
by the circumstances of global terrorism to protect the life of the nation. As
previously discussed, the detention of a noncitizen without the intention or
authority to deport him clearly violates article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR as it
only permits the detention of noncitizens if deportation proceedings have
been initiated. Consequently, in order to meet their obligations under the
ECHR, the United Kingdom had to declare a state of emergency to
temporarily suspend its obligations as permitted under article 15. Article
15 applies only to an exceptional crisis or emergency situation which
affects the entire population and constitutes a threat to the organized life
of the community of the state. 40 9 Therefore, despite the fact that the
European Court ofHuman Rights would afford a wide margin of discretion
to the United Kingdom if the derogation was challenged, it is doubtful that
the situation in the United Kingdom has reached such crisis proportions as
to justify derogation from the ECHR.
In attempting to justify section 23 of the ATCSA, which allows an
individual who is certified as a suspected terrorist, the British government
explained:
Section 23 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
contains an extended power to arrest and detain a foreign national

407. See, e.g., Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 539 (1994) (finding
that the U.K. derogation from the ECHR under article 15 was justified); see also Gross, supra note
97, at 492-93 (discussing how governments often fare well when their decisions concerning the
existence of a particular situation of emergency are reviewed by the European Court of Human
Rights).
408. See Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, § 29.
409. Wadham, supra note 149, at 1074.
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where it is intended to remove or deport the person from the United
Kingdom because the Secretary of State believes that his presence
is a risk to national security and suspects him of being an
international terrorist, but where such removal or deportation is not
for the time being possible. 1 0
The British government's explicit derogation statements emphasized
that many of the victims of the September 11 attacks were British
citizens. 41 The attack, however, did not target Britons exclusively. There
were victims from over seventy countries, including those nations who are
also member states within the Council of Europe. Nevertheless, despite the
fact that these countries were equally affected by the terroristattacks, none
of them have found it necessary to issue derogation orders from the ECHR
in an effort to protect their citizens from further terrorist attacks. The
British government failed to explain why the United Kingdom should be
more affected than other countries. 412 In addition, in passing the ATCSA,
the government admitted that there was no immediate intelligence pointing

to a specific threat in the United Kingdom. 41" For these reasons, it is far
from certain that the United Kingdom is justified in arguing that there is
currently a public emergency which threatens the lives of British citizens.
In discussing the U.K. responsibilities as a member of the ECHR, it is
important to acknowledge that the power of the United Kingdom to
derogate from its obligations under the ECHR is significant. This is
especially evident in comparing the powers of both the United Kingdom
and the United States to protect the rights of noncitizens. The ability for the
United Kingdom to so easily and effortlessly derogate from their
obligations demonstrates that the civil liberties of noncitizens are subject
to the wishes of the government. 414 In contrast, in the United States, where
undoubtedly the impact of the September 11 attacks has been much greater
than that in the United Kingdom, individuals are protected through the
U.S. Constitution and through an explicit Bill of Rights which ensures that

410. Black-Branch, supra note 150, at 22.
411. See id. at 26. At least one-hundred British citizens were killed in the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks - the largest number of Britons ever killed in a day outside war. See Steven Morris
& Jeevan Vasagar, British Death Toll Reaches into the Hundreds, Most Britons Ever killed in a
Day Outside War, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 14, 2001, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/

print/0,3858,4256950-103690,00.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
412. In fact, even Germany, where it has been learned that several of the September 11
hijackers resided before perpetrating the attacks, has refused to issue a derogation order from article
5 of the ECHR.
413. See Tomkins, supra note 6, at 216.
414. See Black-Branch, supra note 150, at 29-30.
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certain fundamental civil liberties cannot be entirely curtailed."
Furthermore, unlike in the United Kingdom, judges in the United States
have the power to strike down legislation which is unconstitutional and
inconsistent with the rights of noncitizens. 41" Thus, under the Patriot Act,
the judicial branch effectively acts as a check on the power of the other
branches of government. Conversely, the ATCSA provides no such
protection to noncitizens subject to the legislation's detention measures.
Furthermore, not only does article 15(1) of the ECHR require a public
emergency before allowing derogation, but also requires that measures
derogating from government obligations must be strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation. 417 In addition to section 23 discussed above,
other provisions relating to the detention of noncitizens certified under the
ATCSA are clearly hard to defend as strictly necessary given the present
situation in the United Kingdom. For example, sections 25 and 26 of the
ATCSA unjustifiably preclude habeas corpus proceedings, as well as
exclude regular judicial review of the Secretary of State's decisions to
certify and consequently indefinitely detain a noncitizen suspected of
terrorism without the right to a trial.4 18 The ATCSA provides that such
decisions and actions can only be questioned in legal proceedings before
the SIAC and thus prevents intervention by courts. 4 19 Furthermore,
procedures before the SIAC are unconventional: the noncitizen does not
have a right to either be present at the hearing or even to be provided with
the specific reasons for the decisions being made regarding his detention. 4 20
In addition, the noncitizen has no choice of legal representation.42' Instead,
his legal representation is chosen for him by the government and is not
even responsible to the noncitizen. 42 2 Finally, and in direct contrast to the
Patriot Act which provides that a noncitizen must be charged within seven
days of being arrested, noncitizens detained pursuantto the ATCSA can be
held without charge or trial for an indefinite period of time.4 23 The prisoner
essentially is charged and convicted of being a terroristwithout the chance
of even being brought before a judge.

415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 30.
id.
id. at 26.
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001,
id. §§ 26, 27.
Tomkins, supra note 6, at 217-18.
id.
id. at 218.

§§ 25, 26.

423. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NEWs RELEASE, UK: GOVERNMENT IN THE DOCK FOR
DETENTION WITHOUT CHARGE OR TRIAL (2002), available at http://www.amnestyusa.

INDEFmn

org/news/2002/uk07172002.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2002).
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The United Kingdom undoubtedly faced a difficult dilemma in the
wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11. The government, however,
failed in striking a balance between protecting the civil liberties of
noncitizens on the one hand and preventing terrorism on the other. In light
of the above mentioned provisions of the ATCSA, it is nearly impossible
to conclude that the measures implemented under part 4 of the ATCSA are
commensurate with the current state of affairs in the United Kingdom. The
government essentially took advantage ofthe terrorist attacks in the United
States to pass a raft of coercive and disproportionate measures that are not
targeted at any exceptional situation which they were purported to address.
Consequently, it is hard to argue that the present circumstances constitute
any type of emergency in the United Kingdom or that the detention
provisions in part 4 of the ATCSA are strictly necessary to deal with the
situation as it currently exists in the country. The United Kingdom should
look more closely to other countries, both those in the European Union and
in particular the United States, for alternative means of monitoring terrorist
suspects without denying them the basic principles of liberty and justice.

VI. CONCLUSION
After September 11, 2001, the United States and the United Kingdom
recognized the vulnerability of their borders. With the passage of the
Patriot Act and the ATCSA, the governments of both nations have new
tools available to combat the threat of terrorism within their borders. With
this unprecedented power, however, also comes new responsibility and the
obligation to learn from past mistakes.
Through the Patriot Act and the ATCSA, the United States and the
United Kingdom respectively have attempted to prevent another attack by
detaining noncitizens suspected ofterrorism who associate with those who
have been identified in connection with prior terrorist activities. History
has taught us, however, that the theory of internment does not work. While
a typical response to terrorism is an effort to remove dangerous factors
from society, the detention strategy is inherently flawed because removing
a volatile element from a society does not defuse its destructive nature but
merely transplants it." For instance, while this strategy has been used
extensively by the British in Northern Ireland, the British have found that
they have largely detained the wrong people and often even when the

424. See Clive Walker, Constitutional Governance and Special Powers Against Terrorism:

Lessons from the United Kingdom's Prevention of TerrorismActs, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1, 17 (1997).
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detentions have proved effective, they have alienated a much larger group
than were originally sympathetic to the terrorists. 45 As Lord Dubs, a
member of the British government, declared in 1998 when debating the
detention provisions in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Bill:
In this Bill the decision has been taken to get rid of the power of
internment. Frankly, it has not worked. The Government cannot see
any circumstances in which they would wish to use the power of

internment. It is fundamentally a process that is against the rule of
law and undermines democratic principles. The Government believe
that to get rid of the power is sensible . .. [w]e do not believe that
it in any way weakens the power of the Government to deal with
terrorism. The use last time of internment to deal with terrorism was
a failure. 426
Furthermore, irrespective of effectiveness, it is essential for the
governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to look at the
effect of the detention provisions contained in the Patriot Act and the

ATCSA on civil liberties as a whole. While on the one hand, these
countries must be permitted to create greater security from future attacks
in an effort to protect their own citizens, on the other hand, it is not
permissible for them to trample on basic civil liberties of noncitizens in
doing so. As a result of the expanded definitions of terrorism and terrorist
activities, as well as the detention provisions contained in both the Patriot
Act and the ATCSA, noncitizens who are suspected of terrorism in both

countries may now find themselves subject to detention, with the potential
for arbitrary indefinite detention as a generally available option for both
governments.
Nevertheless, despite the legitimate concerns that the internment of
noncitizens suspected of terrorism raises regarding how far the United
States and the United Kingdom can proceed in the name of national
security, and besides the fact that detention is ineffective as a means to
combat terrorism, it cannot be ignored that the world is a much different
place than it was prior to September 11, 2001. Understandably, and despite
the infringement of civil liberties and freedoms, the United States and the
United Kingdom were tempted by the ability to control and restrict the
rights of those who were thought to be capable of perpetrating another

425. See Bonner, supra note 30, at 174-75; see generally CHRISTOPHER HEWITT, THE

EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-TERRORIST POuCIES (1984) (examining and comparing the policies that
have been used against urban terrorism, and evaluating their effectiveness).
426. Tomkins, supra note 6, at 214 (quoting Lord Dubs).
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attack. In comparing the Patriot Act and the ATCSA, however, it becomes
apparent how restrained the U.S. legal response to the terrorist attacks
appears. Although not directly attacked, in passing the ATCSA 2001 the
United Kingdom enacted detention measures much more sweeping than
anything found under the Patriot Act.
Assuming that public safety and a secure and civil society is the
primary goal of both the United States and the United Kingdom, the
detention provisions of the Patriot Act are a well-reasoned response to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the face of great stress, the
American system of checks and balances has worked relatively well to
protect the United States from another terrorist attack as well as to detain
only those noncitizens who pose a legitimate threat to the national security
of the nation. That being said, however, the U.S. government should not
necessarily be praised for the detention measures found in the Patriot Act.
While the American public may have initially supported or at least
acquiesced to the detention provisions of the Patriot Act, almost two years
have passed since the attacks of September 11, 2001. It is essential for the
U.S. government to be mindful that these detention provisions do not have
to be permanent and to recognize that they most probably should not be
permanent. In other words, it is important to re-evaluate these provisions
provided the situation stabilizes. The U.S. government must remember that
even those emergency measures enacted in previous conflicts that most
adversely compromised traditional civil liberties - Lincoln's suspension
of habeas corpus, FDR's internment of Japanese-Americans - were reevaluated once the wars were won.427 Quite possibly, if history is any
indication, the current infringements on the civil liberties of noncitizens in
the United States will heighten our sensitivity so that our concern for civil
liberties in the future will be far greater than it is today."2
Conversely, the government of the United Kingdom did not strike any
sort of balance between protecting the basic civil liberties of noncitizens
and guarding against any threat of terrorism in the United Kingdom.
Undoubtedly, in passing the ATCSA, the United Kingdom had the same
goals as the United States. Detaining suspected terrorists using the
disproportionate detention measures under the ATCSA in the absence of
any widely-perceived public emergency, however, is not the answer. The
ATCSA is not a well thought-out and measured response to the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. Given the long U.K. history with terrorism,
the government was well aware of the alternative means of monitoring

427. See Ting, supra note 143, at 1147.
428. Id.
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suspects without denying them the basis principles of liberty and justice.
This Article is not arguing that the government should be denied the
powers it truly needs in order to defend U.K. national security, but these
measures need to be strictly necessary, proportionate, accompanied by
adequate procedural safeguards as well as targeted at a true emergency
situation which they were designed to improve. Unfortunately, the
detention measures of the ATCSA fail to satisfy any of these criteria, and
thus, cannot be justified.
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